I hope everyone had a great holiday weekend.

Today’s blog entry comes by way of University of Iowa Clinical Law Professor Emeritus Leonard Sandler who sent me the appellate decision in the case. After reading the appellate decision, which can be found here, I had to read the trial court decision as well. The appellate decision basically says the trial court got it right when it denied a mandatory injunction, but is otherwise rather light on analysis and what the case is all about. The case of the day concerns Solan v. Arizona, which was decided by the Ninth Circuit on May 5, 2026 in an unpublished decision. The trial court opinion, which is the opinion that will be discussed in this blog entry, can be found at Solan v. Arizona, No. CV-24-02061-PHX-JJT (DMF), 2025 LX 160818 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2025), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120071 * | 2025 LX 160818 | 2025 WL 1694962. The case definitely takes the prize for the most wild set of facts we have yet to encounter in this blog. By way of full disclosure, a lawyer mentioned in the trial court opinion who played a role in the case, Holly Gieszl, is an attorney whom I have consulted with in the past but have no cases with her at present. Also, the trial court discusses state law claims, but we are not going to explore in detail those claims. As usual, the blog is divided into categories and they are: the situation; why plaintiff sufficiently pleaded ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; why collateral estoppel does not apply; why the mandatory injunction gets denied; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

I

The situation

Plaintiff is 35 years old and suffers from numerous disabilities, including Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), PTSD, and Chronic Inflammatory Response Syndrome. These impairment substantially limit many of his major life activities. Prior to his confinement at the Arizona State Hospital, he utilized his service dog, Foxy, to help manage the effects of his disabilities. In 2019, plaintiff was arrested and confined to a County detention facility without Foxy and was subsequently committed to the Arizona State Hospital without Foxy as a result of being found guilty except insane of aggravated assault. While in County detention, he petitioned to have his service animal to accompany him. The county denied that request and he sued. During the course of that litigation, the service animal passed away and so the parties agreed that the matter was moot. He renewed the lawsuit once he was committed to the Arizona State Hospital when the hospital denied the request to have his new service animal be with him. The service animal the plaintiff wanted with him at the hospital was his prior service animal that had been cloned at his own considerable expense and then trained to be a service animal.

In the first lawsuit, plaintiff also filed a motion for preliminary injunction challenging the denial of the service animal request and requesting that the defendant be ordered to admit service dogs unless or until it is proven by substantial evidence that a particular dog poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others that cannot be mitigated by reasonable accommodations. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits of his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and ordered the Arizona State Hospital to conduct a particularized assessment of the request in order to determine: 1) whether reasonable modification to its policies, practices, and procedures could be made in order to permit plaintiff the use of his service animal while housed at the forensic hospital; and 2) whether the service animal would be disruptive to the health or safety of other patients at plaintiff’s current housing unit based on reasonable judgment relying on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence and including an assessment of individual patients at plaintiff’s current housing unit and the effect the service animal may have on them, including the probability that injury will actually occur.

From there, things went off the rails even more. The hospital issued a Particularized Assessment Letter that did the following: 1) enumerated policies that might need to be altered without explaining why any of those alterations were required or how the alterations would impose a substantial burden; 2) made several defamatory allegations on plaintiff’s character and falsely accused him of making statements showing that he had engaged in or intended to engage in sexual conduct with his service animal. The accusations were categorically false, had no evidentiary support, and had never been raised during plaintiff’s treatment at the hospital or in any of the State’s pleadings prior to the court order requiring the particularized assessment.

The evidence presented clearly shows that the cloned dog had been trained to be his service animal and was capable of doing that job. Plaintiff claimed that the denial of the service animal destroyed his therapeutic relationship with his providers and caused him to experience distress, anguish, and heightened mental health symptoms. He also was forced to pay expenses to board the dog pass the time needed for her training.

II

Why plaintiff sufficiently pleaded ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims

1. In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff has to show: 1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 3) the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination by reason of his disability.
2. Nobody disputed that plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability and that the Arizona State Hospital was a public entity through which he qualified to receive services.
3. The allegations that he had previously used his service dog to ameliorate the effects of his disabilities prior to being committed and that the lack of the service dog made him unable to effectively engage in any of the treatment programs offered by the Arizona State Hospital are sufficient to show that he was being denied benefits and services he could otherwise receive from the Arizona State Hospital but for his disabilities. It also was sufficient to show that the State’s denial of his request for the service animal discriminated against him because of the disability. Accordingly, these allegations are sufficient to get beyond a motion to dismiss.
4. Arguments by the defendants to the contrary attacked the merits of the claims and not whether plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to proceed, and therefore are not applicable at this stage of the case.

III

Why collateral estoppel does not apply

1. Several months passed between plaintiff’s receipt of the 2022 Particularized Assessment and the dismissal of his first lawsuit. However, for collateral estoppel to apply, it is not enough simply to show that the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in a prior action. Instead, the parties must actually have litigated the issue. Further, the issue must be one that was necessary to decide the merits.
2. Issue preclusion requires that an issue was necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be conclusive in the subsequent suit.
3. The State has not carried its burden of showing the parties ever litigated the sufficiency of the 2022 Particularized Assessment in the first lawsuit or that the court made any rulings on it essential to the dismissal of that action. The dismissal was clearly based on mootness with the first service animal having passed away. Therefore, there could not have been any judgments having any preclusive effects.
4. The issue before the court was whether the State has sufficient reason to exclude the second service dog and not whether the State’s prior letter was sufficient to exclude the original service dog.

IV

Why the mandatory injunction gets denied

1. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show: 1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; 2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; 3) the balance of equities tip in his favor; and 4) an injunction is in the public interest.
2. When a plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction, injunctive relief is subject to a higher standard than when he seeks a prohibitory injunction. In the mandatory injunction situation, those injunctions are only permissible when extreme or very serious damage will result in a situation that is not capable of compensatory damages and the merits of the case are not in doubt. Further, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, any injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.
3. A public entity has to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability absent the public entity demonstrating a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service, program, or activity or an undue financial and administrative burden.
4. When a public entity refuses to make the requested accommodation on fundamental alteration or undue burden grounds, the decision must be made by the head of a public entity or his or her designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity. It also must be accompanied by a written statement of the reason for reaching that conclusion.
5. While a public entity may impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of the services, program, or activities, it must also ensure that those safety requirements are based on actual risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.
6. With regards to service animals, a public entity generally must modify its policies, practices, or procedures in order to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability. Where a service animal was permitted, it has to be under the control of its handler and the public entity is not responsible for its care or supervision of the service animal.
7. The State argues that plaintiff cannot show that the State denied him any benefits based on his disabilities because having a service animal is not necessary for the plaintiff to participate in or benefit from the hospital’s services, programs, and activities. The State pointed out that the plaintiff admitted in an interview that he does not need the service animal for any physical limitations. The State also argued that having a service animal would not help plaintiff with his mental disabilities, but rather it would hinder plaintiff’s ability to benefit from the mental health services the hospital was designed to provide. In particular, the service animal would impede the purpose of commitment to the hospital, which was in part to learn how to better get along with people. Finally, plaintiff admitted to liking animals better than people.
8. Several comments made by the plaintiff gives the court reason to suggest that there might be an unnatural attachment (sexual), between the plaintiff and his service animal. It doesn’t matter that plaintiff said those statements were taken out of context or that the court had previously held that those statements utilized as the basis for denial of the second service animal were pretextual.

V

Thoughts/takeaways

1. This case definitely takes the award for most wild set of facts we have ever seen in this blog.
2. While the mandatory injunction was denied, the case still proceeds with respect to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and the court required those claims to be answered by the defendant.
3. While we did not discuss the state law claims (defamation), the state allows those claims to proceed as well and the court required those claims to be answered by the defendant.
4. The Ninth Circuit decision affirmed the trial court’s denial of the preliminary injunction finding no clear error existed, but the Ninth Circuit did not address any other claims.
5. The case raises the real question of whether the DOJ Title II service animal regulations stop at the state hospital or “prisons,” gate. Nothing in the regulations suggests that they do. That said, what is a fundamental alteration may have a different set of considerations in a state hospital or in a prison.
6. This decision also suggests that in a prison or state hospital situation, a court might give considerable deference to what is said by those authorities v. the deference they might give in any other context. For example, the court talks about how legitimate safety requirements must be based on actual risks, and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities. However, while the facts seem to be in dispute in this case, the court largely brushes it off, with respect to the injunction claim anyway. It will be interesting to see what deference is given as the case proceeds.
7. The trial court mentions the requirement that a CEO sign off on any undue burden/fundamental alteration defense, but there is no indication that the CEO actually did that in this case. You would be surprised how often nonfederal governmental entities (entities subject to Title II), are not aware of this requirement.
8. The information shared by the plaintiff with his treatment providers was actually used against him. I have seen similar situations arise with respect to students with disabilities sharing information with their university/college counselors.
9. Mandatory injunctions have to meet a higher standard than prohibitory injunctions if they are to be granted.
10. Interesting that the court dismisses alleged sexual proclivities with respect to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, but says those concerns are valid with respect to a mandatory injunction claim.
11. One of the issues in service animal disputes that arises frequently is whether it is the disability being accommodated or whether it is the essential functions of the job that is being accommodated. As we have discussed in the blog, the courts go both ways on that. That issue gets complicated when it comes to the prison or state hospital context. Here, Arizona essentially argued that in order to fix the disability, a person could not have his service dog. Fixing the disability is ableism, but here the plaintiff was found guilty except insane. So, fixing the disability so to speak is very much a part of why the plaintiff was committed in the first place.
12. The plaintiff is pro se. This is a real complicated case when it comes to the service animal rules and what might be a fundamental alteration to the programs, services, and activities of the State Hospital. So, one wonders whether the plaintiff will be able to retain an ADA knowledgeable team. This is not an easy case to pursue absent such a team.
13. While we will have to see, this case doesn’t seem likely to settle.