Yesterday was 9/11 and certainly thinking of everyone.  Also, I appreciate everyone bearing with me on my two week hiatus while my wife and I were abroad. We came back Friday and back to the grind now.

 

Today’s case is an unpublished decision. Lee v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc., from the Ninth Circuit decided August 18, 2023, which can be found here. It asks the question of what happens when you terminate someone for conduct related to the disability and do not factor that into the analysis. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning summary judgment not warranted on disability discrimination claim; court’s reasoning summary judgment was warranted on retaliation claim; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts (Taken from the Lower Court Opinion and Also Summarized as Well)

 

On March 13, 2019, Lee, the plaintiff, participated in a meeting with the human resources representative where they discussed that he was diagnosed with PTSD and that he did not need accommodation to perform his job.

 

On November 6, 2019, Igne witnessed Lee pressure-washing while wearing shorts and asked Lee to change into rain pants. [L3Harris’s CSOF ¶ 16; Lee’s CSOF ¶ 16.] Because Lee could not hear Igne’s requests due to the pressure washer’s noise, Igne attempted to get Lee’s attention by yelling and honking a vehicle’s horn. [Lee Depo. Trans. at 30-31; L3Harris’s CSOF, Decl. of Lindsay Haen (“Haen Decl.”),[3] Exh. O (Lee’s written statement to Martin regarding the 11/6/19 events, dated 11/7/19).] A coworker then walked over to Lee and gave him a pair of rubber rain pants. [Lee Depo. Trans. at 24.]

Later during the day of the pressure-washing incident, Lee went to the office where Igne was. According to Lee, he did not yell at Igne, but he admits he swore at Igne because Igne swore at him first. Lee states he told Igne that, if he had to wear his personal protective equipment (“PPE”), then Igne needed to wear his. Lee then told Igne that, if he did not bring his PPE the following Monday, then he would turn Igne in. According to Lee, it was at this point when Igne swore at Lee and Lee swore back at Igne. [Id. at 39-40.] They exchanged swear words “twice, maybe three times,” then Lee walked away. [Id. at 40.] Lee contends in his deposition testimony that he did not yell at Igne. [Id. at 39.] But, in his written statement to Martin the day after the incident, Lee wrote that he yelled at Igne. [Haen Decl., Exh. O (“that’s when I started yelling and swearing at him”).]

The next day, Igne submitted a written complaint to Martin. [L3Harris’s CSOF, Decl. of Rodney Martin (“Martin Decl.”) ¶ 4.] Martin states Igne expressed to him that he “felt threatened by” Lee and “did not feel comfortable working with [Lee] after” their interaction. [Id.] Martin investigated the incident by speaking with Lee and the other workers present and took statements from those involved. [Id.] Although Lee and Igne “had somewhat differing versions of the interaction,” Martin states “the statements by [Lee’s] co-workers generally supported Mr. Igne’s version of events and that Mr. Lee was swearing, angry and aggressive towards Mr. Igne.” [Id.]

One of Lee’s coworkers, David Hesapene (“Hesapene”), submitted a written statement to Martin the day after the incident.[4] [Haen Decl., Exh. P (Hesapene’s written statement to Martin regarding the 11/6/19 events, signed 11/7/19).] There, Hesapene states that, around 5:45 p.m., he heard Lee “going off, yelling at [Igne].” [Id.] Hesapene heard Lee “swearing the F word at [Igne] and [Igne] yelled back in defense.” [Id.] Although Hesapene “couldn’t hear everything that was being said clearly,” he states Lee “was extremely loud and angry and not acting in a civil manner.” [Id.] The day after the incident, Lee said to Hesapene, “`I don’t care if I going to lose my job, I just going to punch [Igne] through his face.'”[5] [Id.] After Hesapene told Lee, “I thought you guys settled this years ago,” Lee said “`F—- [Martin], F—- [Igne], nobody can touch me, not [Martin], not [Igne] or HR.'” [Id.] However, Hesapene testified in his deposition that he did not believe Lee was going to punch Igne. [Lee’s CSOF, Decl. of Joseph T. Rosenbaum (“Rosenbaum Decl.”), Exh. B (excerpts of trans. of 9/22/21 Hesapene depo.) (“Hesapene Depo. Trans.”) at 44.[6]]

Another coworker, Mark Vegas (“Vegas”), also submitted a written statement to Martin the day after the incident. [L3Harris’s CSOF, Haen Decl., Exh. Q (Vegas’s written statement to Martin regarding the 11/6/19 events, dated 11/7/2019).] Vegas states that, around 5:45 p.m., he could hear Lee “explode in anger with [Igne] about something to do with having to wear pants. [Lee’s] voice was very loud as he yelled and swore at [Igne] and seemed to get louder. . . .” [Id.] Vegas also states “[t]here was such a flurry of words coming out of [Lee’s] mouth that it was difficult to remember everything [Lee] was saying plus [he] was in another office with the door closed but [he] could still hear [Lee] yelling.” [Id.] The next day, Vegas heard Lee “bragging in the shop out loud that [Igne] tried and he cannot touch me, [Martin] cannot touch me and HR cannot touch me.” [Id.]

The last coworker present during the incident, Gilbert Castro (“Castro”), also wrote a statement to Martin. [Haen Decl., Exh. R (Castro’s written statement, dated 11/7/19).] Castro “heard [Lee] yelling at [Igne] in an angry tone” and “swearing.” [Id. at PageID #: 530.] Although Castro “could not hear all the details that were being said because [he] was in another room and the office door was closed[,]” he “could tell that [Lee] was very angry and was very loud.” [Id. at PageID#: 530-31.]

Martin states that, during his investigation, Lee’s coworkers expressed their concerns about Lee’s “volatile conduct,” and that they were concerned Lee “was a loose cannon and they did not know when [Lee] was going to snap because of how angry he would become about little things.” [Martin Decl. ¶ 5] However, Hesapene testified in his deposition that he did not believe Lee’s aggressive behavior created a hostile work environment for him, Igne, Martin, or in general. [Hesapene Depo. Trans. at 39-41.] Castro testified similarly. [Rosenbaum Decl., Exh. A (excerpts of trans. of 9/22/21 depo. of Castro) (“Castro Depo. Trans.”) at 63.[7]]

A subsequent meeting with HR led to Lee saying that his supervisor had been stealing gas. That investigation did not lead to a confirmation of those charges but did reveal how the relationship between Lee and his supervisor was beyond repair.

When Lee was terminated, he eventually brought suit alleging that he was terminated on the basis of his PTSD and was retaliated against for reporting his supervisor’s alleged misconduct.

 

II

Court’s Reasoning Summary Judgment on the Disability Discrimination Claim Was Not Warranted

  1. Establishing a prima facie case means showing: 1) plaintiff is disabled; 2) plaintiff is qualified to hold his job if provided reasonable accommodation; and 3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.
  2. Lee supplied competent evidence that he had been employed for 26 years in various positions without performance issues by U.S. Navy contractors at the Pacific Missile Range facility.
  3. A reasonable trier of fact could find that the threatening language used by Lee with reference to his supervisor in a conversation with a coworker did not constitute a serious and credible threat of violence. Further, the defendant did not point to any other undisputed evidence requiring a rational trier of fact to find in its favor.
  4. Lee’s receipt of disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs is not inconsistent with him being qualified vis-à-vis the ADA. Further, nothing he stated in connection with his benefits application to the Veterans Administration is irreconcilable with his contention that he is qualified to do his job per the ADA.
  5. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the concerns leading to Lee’s employment termination was based upon his PTSD.
  6. Conduct resulting from a disability is considered to be part of the disability rather than a separate basis for termination. A rational trier of fact could conclude that Lee’s conduct during the November incident resulted from his PTSD.
  7. A reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant’s evaluation of the November 2019 incident was controlled by stereotypical thinking about persons with PTSD.
  8. Since the decision to fire Lee was made in January of 2020, the temporal sequence of events is consistent with a rational inference of causation.
  9. The defendant was aware of Lee’s PTSD, and his PTSD was mentioned prominently in an internal communication regarding whether to take disciplinary action against him after the November 2019 incident. Given conflicting inferences, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant’s decision to terminate Lee based upon the November incident was pretextual.

III

Court’s Reasoning Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted on the Retaliation Claim

  1. Since the defendant had already begun its investigation into the November 9, 2019 incident by the time Lee had already made his report, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the investigation was undertaken in retaliation for the report. Further, plaintiff did not point to any evidence supporting a reasonable inference that his report of the alleged gas stealing was what caused him to be fired, outside of arguments he made about the timing of the report involving his supervisor.

IV

Thoughts/Takeaways

  1. Big mistake to stereotype disability diagnosis at any stage of the employment process.
  2. The interactive process can go a long way towards dispelling any unconscious or conscious bias with respect to disability diagnosis.
  3. Early disclosure of disability by the employee is always better.
  4. Employees with disabilities are in a bit of a box. If they don’t disclose, they do not get the protections of the ADA if they need accommodations. On the other hand, evidence exists that if they do disclose, the worksite becomes much more uncomfortable to work in.
  5. As to what goes on in the mind of a person with a disability in deciding to disclose, see this Federal Bar Association blog entry.
  6. As we discussed here, a disability does not excuse bad conduct. However, this decision says that conduct relating from a disability is part of the disability rather than a separate basis for termination. So, if disability related conduct is involved, get with legal counsel to thoroughly review the record to see how the separation between the disability related conduct and workplace conduct rules pan out in a particular circumstance. Also, different jurisdictions may view differently just how much mileage a plaintiff can get from saying that conduct resulting from the disability is considered part of the disability rather than a separate basis for termination.
  7. We discussed here for example, how filing for disability benefit does not necessarily lead to a not qualified per the ADA finding. As the court notes in our case of the day, what is said in those applications can be very important. Further, failure of an attorney to understand just how important what is said in the application is and to advise the client on the possible consequences of filing for disability benefits, may be legal malpractice, as we discussed here.
  8. The decision is unpublished, so mileage on this case may vary.

Before getting started on the blog entry of the day, a couple of housekeeping matters in order. First, congratulations to the women of Spain for winning the World Cup. Second, my wife and I will be taking a very special trip abroad starting August 29 and returning September 8. So, this will be the last blog entry until the week of September 11.

 

The case of the day, Hamilton v. Dallas County, here, is actually not an ADA case at all. Rather, it is an en banc decision from the Fifth Circuit talking about what is an adverse action for purposes of title VII. The Fifth Circuit throws out its prior jurisprudence saying that an adverse action could only be an ultimate employment decision and then adopts a different test. The decision has implications for the question of whether a failure to accommodate is an adverse action, which is why I am blogging on this case. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: majority opinion that ultimate employment decision is necessary for an adverse action is not good law; Judge Ho concurring opinion; Judge Jones concurring in the judgment only opinion; and thought/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts

 

The Dallas County Sheriff’s Department gives its detention service officer two days off each week. The department uses a sex-based policy to determine the two days an officer can pick. Only men can select the weekends off-women cannot do that. Instead, female officers can pick either two weekdays off or one weekend day plus one weekday. Bottom line: female officers never get a full weekend off.

 

Nine female detention service officer sued alleging that this policy violate title VII prohibition against sex discrimination. A panel of the Fifth Circuit held that its prior case law demanded an ultimate employment decision before an adverse action could be found. However, it also noted that it had severe reservations with that line of cases and invited the court as a whole to revisit that line of cases en banc. The 11th Circuit agreed to do so, and in this opinion they overturn that prior line of cases.

 

II

Majority Opinion That Ultimate Employment Decision Is Necessary for an Adverse Action Is Not Good Law

 

  1. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
  2. For decades in the Fifth Circuit, disparate treatment liability was limited to ultimate employment decisions.
  3. The Fifth Circuit decision setting forth an ultimate employment decision rule was actually based upon a misinterpretation of a prior Fourth Circuit decision. Nevertheless, the ultimate employment decision line of cases persisted for decades.
  4. Nowhere in title VII does it say implicitly or explicitly that employment discrimination of lawful is limited to non ultimate employment decisions.
  5. While it is true that the statute prohibits discrimination in ultimate employment decisions, the statute also makes it unlawful for an employer to otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to terms, condition, or privileges of employment.
  6. Restricting liability under the statute only to ultimate employment decisions renders the statute catchall provision superfluous, which is something the court will not do.
  7. Absent persuasive indication to the contrary, it must be presumed that Congress says exactly what it means and means what it says. Here, Congress did not say that title VII liability is solely limited to ultimate employment decisions.
  8. The Supreme Court confirmed this approach. The Supreme Court has held that an adverse employment action need only be a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Also, it has been clear that a title VII plaintiff may recover damages even for discrimination in the terms, condition, or privileges of employment not involving a discharge, loss of pay, or other concrete effect on their employment status.
  9. Title VII’s coverage is also not limited to economic or tangible discrimination because it covers not only terms and conditions in the narrow sense, but also evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire range of disparate treatment of men and women in employment. That is, any benefits comprising the incidents of employment, or forming an aspect of that relationship between the employer and the employee falls within title VII’s ban on discrimination.
  10. No other United States Court of Appeals has taken such a narrow view of an adverse employment action.
  11. The ultimate employment doctrine standard lies on fatally flawed foundations and must be overturned.
  12. Adverse action is not a statutory term but rather a judicially created term. Adverse action is utilized as a shorthand for the statutory phrase, “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
  13. To show an adverse employment action, a plaintiff need only allege facts plausibly showing discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or in the terms, condition, or privileges of their employment.
  14. Terms, conditions, or privileges of employment is a very broad phrase not limited to economic or tangible discrimination and covers more than terms and conditions in the narrow contractual sense.
  15. The days and hours that a person works are classic terms or conditions of employment. In fact, those details go to the very heart of the work for pay arrangement.
  16. The complaint’s allegations also support a plausible inference that the right to pick work shifts based on seniority is a privilege of employment within the county.
  17. A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be handed out in a discriminatory fashion.
  18. The county’s position that a shift change, without more, is not an adverse employment action simply doesn’t hold up for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has said that title VII is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination. Second, to accept this line of thinking would render superfluous the key phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges,” as the very same section already prohibit discrimination with respect to an employee’s compensation.
  19. Title VII does not permit liability for de minimis workplace trifles. Even so, it is plausible that requiring female officer to work weekends but not male officers is a tangible, objective, and material instance of sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and is far more than de minimis. Same can be said for denying seniority privileges to female officers while allowing male officers to exercise theirs.
  20. The court leaves for another day the precise level of minimum workplace harm that a plaintiff must allege on top of showing discrimination in one’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The court reiterates this in a footnote when it says that nothing in the opinion or in the citation to other opinions should be read to forecast the Fifth Circuit view on what level of materiality is required for an adverse action.

 

III

Judge Ho Concurring Opinion

 

  1. When circuit court precedent is erroneous, it shouldn’t matter if overturning that precedent leads to more questions. The precedent needs to be overturned regardless, which is exactly what the en banc decision does (only an en banc decision has the authority to overturn erroneous circuit precedent).
  2. To phrase it another way, fidelity to text sometimes requires overturning a precedent. Overturning precedent sometimes results in unanswered questions the court may need to address in future cases. However, that is exactly what courts are for and it is not a reason to ignore text. The Supreme Court did exactly this in both Groff v. DeJoy, which we discussed here, and in the recent affirmative-action decisions.

 

IV

Judge Jones Concurring in the Judgment Only Opinion

 

  1. The majority gets the result right but makes a mistake by not laying out what is an adverse action so that courts and others can have guidance. So, the majority essentially says that speeding is illegal but does not give a speed limit.
  2. The Supreme Court will resolve next term a Circuit Court split in a case asking similar questions as to what an adverse action is. So, it would have been more prudent to continue with the ultimate employment line of precedents until the Supreme Court comes down with a decision.
  3. A possible standard would be to say that actionable discrimination must entail a materially adverse change in working conditions when viewed objectively by a reasonable observer. Such a standard is supported by the provisions of §703(a)(1) and title VII cases dealing with hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge claims.
  4. Title VII does not effectuate a general civility code for the workplace. However, the majority opinion heads down that road because it has no baseline for discrimination based on terms or conditions of employment.

 

V

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. It is hard to believe in 2023 that a county would have such a policy. Nevertheless, they do.
  2. We have previously discussed the emerging issue of terms, condition, or privileges of employment here for example.
  3. The ADA has very similar language to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), but it uses “on the basis of,” or “by reason of,” for causation. As we discussed here, causation has the same meaning despite the different terminology used in the statutes.
  4. More than de minimis can mean a lot of different things. For example, undue hardship/burden and fundamental alteration per the ADA. It also could mean what the Supreme Court talks about in Groff v. DeJoy, which we discussed here.
  5. A broad reading of what is an adverse action would certainly support the proposition that a failure to accommodate is an adverse action. Some circuit courts are already taking that position.
  6. Judge Jones is quite correct when she says that the Supreme Court next term will have two cases before it dealing with the adverse action question when it comes to title VII (a least one of them if not both-I would have to check-involved the question of transfer to another position).
  7. Judge Jones opinion lays out an idea that other courts, particularly the Supreme Court, might utilize as a standard.
  8. Judge Ho is also quite correct that the current Supreme Court doesn’t hesitate to overturn prior precedent it feels is erroneous regardless of what questions might arise when taking that approach.
  9. One wonders whether this case would not be appealed to the Supreme Court because the majority opinion sets forth such an amorphous standard. As a result, that arguably creates a Circuit Court split in courts that have a more concrete standard and take a narrower view of what an adverse action is.
  10. The cases before the Supreme Court next term as well as this one (one wonders if this case would not get folded into the other two cases perhaps), definitely bear watching because of the implications of the cases have on whether failure to accommodate requires an adverse action.

Today’s blog entry is a twofer with respect to proposed rules that have come down from two different agencies in the last week. The first is the proposed rule for the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. The second is the proposed rule from the FCC concerning accessibility of videoconferencing platforms. The blog entry is divided into categories of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act proposed rule and the FCC proposed rule on video conferencing accessibility. The blog entry is really short, so you will probably want to read the whole thing.

 

I

PWFA Proposed Rule

 

Robin Shea, here, in her blog does a fabulous job of discussing the PWFA proposed rule (the proposed rule itself goes 279 pages and can be found here). I do want to add a few thoughts/points of emphasis of my own, so here goes:

 

  1. A lot of the proposed rule resembles the ADA but not entirely. For example, the concept of undue hardship and the interactive process are the same. The concept of essential functions is the same to a point. The big difference is temporary waiver of essential functions is in play, which is not the case with the ADA.
  2. Any accommodation has to be the result of the interactive process. One wonders if the EEOC will not get more aggressive on this point when it comes to disability related accommodations.
  3. PWFA focuses on known limitation related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (a big list is given by the EEOC and it includes infertility for example). So “known limitation,” leads you to different places than the ADA with respect to the accommodation process. Proving up “known limitation,” so to speak is going to be much easier than proving up disability, which after the amendments to the ADA should not be all that hard but is still harder than proving up “known limitation.”
  4. In the ADA world, the prohibition on excessive documentation can be a bit ambiguous. The rules are more certain on the title I side, but less clear on the title II and title III side. The latter (title II and title III),  just having a prohibition on unnecessary medical inquiries in the applicable Technical Assistance Memorandum. The proposed rule for PWFA illustrates that the EEOC is going to be really serious about looking at situations where employers seek documentation to justify an accommodation per the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. It is not going to be simple to defend any such cases. There are a few accommodations that must be automatically granted, i.e you can’t even seek documentation when those conditions are involved. With respect to other conditions, employers are going to want to be very very careful about when they seek documentation and to be sure that the scope of the documentation the employer seeks is very limited. One has to wonder if the EEOC won’t start looking at documentation requests for accommodations under the ADA in a similar manner. If I am on the plaintiff side, I would certainly be making that argument that disability related documentation for demonstrating the need for a reasonable accommodation should operate the same way as this proposed rule does when it comes to seeking further documentation.
  5. Very interesting about how the proposed rule says that there is no confidentiality requirement. However, that isn’t the end of the story. The ADA mandates that medical information be kept confidential. Since everyone covered by the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act is also covered by the ADA, the information that comes out in the accommodation process under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (which is necessarily medical information), must be kept confidential per the ADA.
  6. People have until October 10, 2023, to comment on the rule in the EEOC specifically asks for comments on a bunch of things related to the proposed rule.

 

II

FCC Proposed Rule and Video Conferencing Accessibility

 

  1. The FCC proposed rule can be found here.
  2. I use video conferencing platforms all the time. In particular, I use my Bluetooth technology as well as automatic speech recognition to effectively access the videoconferencing platform.
  3. The rule seems to suggest that the FCC wants to move away from dial in access to the ability to just use the platform with captioning. I sincerely hope they don’t do that because it would be a disaster for me as a deaf person functioning entirely in the hearing world with Bluetooth technology, lip reading, and advanced hearing aids. I really do need to be able to dial in and use my Bluetooth technology to effectively access video conferencing platforms.
  4. The other thing about the rule is that I didn’t see anything that said the ASR on must be the default option. Currently, it is for Google Meets and for Microsoft teams but is not for Zoom. I can’t tell you how many times Zoom not having the ASR on as the default option has caused me problems.
  5. People have until September 6, 2023, to comment on the rule, and the FCC specifically asks for comments on a bunch of things related to the proposed rule.

Last week, DOJ came out with a proposed rule for title II entities with respect to mobile apps and their Internet sites, here. Certainly big news, so we are going to talk about it. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: purpose of proposed rule, need for the rule, and benefits of the rule; the text of the proposed rule; and 60+ questions. Please note that my thoughts/takeaways/questions appear underneath the applicable section of the proposed rule.

 

I

Purpose of Proposed Rule, Need for the Rule, and Benefits of the Rule

 

  1. DOJ since 1996, consistently has taken the viewpoint that title II of the ADA applies to all services, programs, and activities of the public entities, including those provided by the way of the web.
  2. Governmental entities use apps and websites all the time and members of the public frequently access governmental entities through their website and through associated apps in a myriad of different ways. Therefore, it is critical to ensure that people with disabilities can access web content and mobile apps quickly, easily, independently, and equally (the proposed rule contains numerous examples of the ways that people access governmental entities by way of the web and mobile apps).
  3. While many public health mandates addressing Covid-19 are no longer in place, durable changes to State and local governmental entities operations and public preferences necessitating greater access online services, program, and activities remain and are likely to be permanent.
  4. Millions of individuals in the United States have disabilities affecting their use of the web and mobile apps. Many of those individuals use assistive technology, such as speech recognition and screen readers, to enable them to navigate websites or access information contained on those websites.
  5. Voluntary compliance with the web content accessibility guidelines has not resulted in equal access for people with disabilities.
  6. DOJ and other federal agencies have taken enforcement action against public entities regarding the lack of access for people with disabilities to their websites.
  7. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 has been consistently used by DOJ as the basis for settlements.
  8. A 2021 study found that 71% of county websites did not conform to Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 and the remaining 29% only partially conformed to the standards. Given the minimal progress in web accessibility over the last 20 years, DOJ does not expect compliance with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 level AA to improve significantly in the absence of a rule.
  9. The rule will foster increased independence, flexibility, and dignity for persons with disabilities when accessing the services, programs, and activities of title II entities electronically.
  10. The rule will foster increased privacy for persons with disabilities when accessing the services, programs, and activities of title II entities electronically.
  11. The rule will reduce frustration experienced by people with disabilities when accessing the services, programs, and activities of title II entities electronically.
  12. The rule will decrease the need for persons with disabilities to rely on others while they attempt to access title II entities by ways of electronic means.
  13. The rule will increase program participation for persons with disabilities.
  14. The rule will increase civic engagement and inclusion.
  15. The rule will increase certainty about what constitutes an accessible website under the ADA and potentially reduce litigation.

 

II

The Proposed Rule Text (my thoughts//takeaways/questions appear within).

PART 35—NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

  1. The authority citation for part 35 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510; 42 U.S.C. 12134, 12131, and 12205a.

Subpart A—General

  1. Amend § 35.104 by adding definitions for Archived web content, Conventional electronic documents, Mobile applications (apps), Special district government, Total population, WCAG 2.1, and Web content in alphabetical order to read as follows:

Definitions.

* * * * *

Archived web content means web content that—

(1) Is maintained exclusively for reference, research, or recordkeeping;

(2) Is not altered or updated after the date of archiving; and

(3) Is organized and stored in a dedicated area or areas clearly identified as being archived.

* * * * *

Conventional electronic documents means web content or content in mobile apps that is in the following electronic file formats: portable document formats (“PDF”), word processor file formats, presentation file formats, spreadsheet file formats, and database file formats.

* * * * *

Mobile applications (“apps”) means software applications that are downloaded and designed to run on mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets.

* * * * *

Special district government means a public entity—other than a county, municipality, or township, or independent school district—authorized by State law to provide one function or a limited number of designated functions with sufficient administrative and fiscal autonomy to qualify as a separate government and whose population is not calculated by the United States Census Bureau in the most recent decennial Census or Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates.

* * * * *

Total population means the population estimate for a public entity as calculated by the United States Census Bureau in the most recent decennial Census or, if a public entity is an independent school district, the population estimate as calculated by the United States Census Bureau in the most recent Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates.

* * * * *

WCAG 2.1 means the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”) 2.1, W3C® Recommendation 05 June 2018, https://www.w3.org/​TR/​2018/​REC-WCAG21-20180605/​ [ https://perma.cc/​UB8A-GG2F]. WCAG 2.1 is incorporated by reference elsewhere in this part (see § 35.200 and 35.202).

Web content means information or sensory experience—including the encoding that defines the content’s structure, presentation, and interactions—that is communicated to the user by a web browser or other software. Examples of web content include text, images, sounds, videos, controls, animations, and conventional electronic documents.

Subpart H—Web and Mobile Accessibility

  1. Add new subpart H to read as follows:

Subpart H—Web and Mobile Accessibility

35.200

Requirements for web and mobile accessibility.

35.201

Exceptions.

35.202

Conforming alternate versions.

35.203

Equivalent facilitation.

35.204

Duties.

35.205–35.209

[Reserved]

Requirements for web and mobile accessibility.

  • A public entity shall ensure that the following are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities:

(1) Web content that a public entity makes available to members of the public or uses to offer services, programs, or activities to members of the public; and

(2) Mobile apps that a public entity makes available to members of the public or uses to offer services, programs, or activities to members of the public.

Thoughts/takeaways/Questions: the standard is readily accessible and usable. What does that mean? Currently, title II litigation, as well as a title III litigation for that matter, turns on whether there is meaningful accessibility for a particular person with a disability.

(b) Requirements

(1) Effective two years from the publication of this rule in final form, a public entity, other than a special district government, with a total population of 50,000 or more shall ensure that the web content and mobile apps it makes available to members of the public or uses to offer services, programs, or activities to members of the public comply with Level A and Level AA success criteria and conformance requirements specified in WCAG 2.1, unless the public entity can demonstrate that compliance with this section would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.

(2) Effective three years from the publication of this rule in final form, a public entity with a total population of less than 50,000 or any public entity that is a special district government shall ensure that the web content and mobile apps it makes available to members of the public or uses to offer services, programs, or activities to members of the public comply with Level A and Level AA success criteria and conformance requirements specified in WCAG 2.1, unless the public entity can demonstrate that compliance with this section would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.

(3) WCAG 2.1 is incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved incorporation by reference (“IBR”) material is available for inspection at the U.S. Department of Justice and at the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”). Contact the U.S. Department of Justice at: Disability Rights Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 150 M St. NE, 9th Floor, Washington, DC 20002; ADA Information Line: (800) 514–0301 (voice) or 1–833–610–1264 (TTY); website: www.ada.gov. For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/​federal-register/​cfr/​ibr-locations.html or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. The material may be obtained from the World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C®”) Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), 401 Edgewater Place, Suite 600, Wakefield, MA 01880; phone: (339) 273–2711; email: contact@w3.org; website: www.w3.org/​TR/​2018/​REC-WCAG21-20180605/​ [ https://perma.cc/​UB8A-GG2F].

Thoughts/takeaways/questions:

  1. WCAG is not static. I know there has been talk about a WCAG 3.0 that might have a radically different look. What happens as the WCAG evolves?
  2. Level AA and level A both need to be complied with.
  3. The years a title II entity has to comply depends upon the population of where the title II entity is and not the population of what the particular title II entity serves.
  4. Undue financial and administrative burden is going to be very difficult to show because you look to the entire resources of the title II entity and because a high-level person in the governmental entity will have to certify that such a burden exists. Further, everything short of undue financial and administrative burden must be done first.

Exceptions.

The requirements of § 35.200 of this chapter do not apply to the following:

(a) Archived web content. Archived web content as defined in § 35.104 of this chapter.

(b) Preexisting conventional electronic documents. Conventional electronic documents created by or for a public entity that are available on a public entity’s website or mobile app before the date the public entity is required to comply with this rule, unless such documents are currently used by members of the public to apply for, gain access to, or participate in a public entity’s services, programs, or activities.

Thoughts/takeaways/questions:

  1. This particular provision deals with conventional electronic documents created by or for a public entity available on the website or mobile app for the date the public entity is required to comply with the rule. After that date, those conventional documents need to be accessible to persons with disabilities.

(c) Web content posted by a third party. Web content posted by a third party that is available on a public entity’s website.

(d) Linked third-party web content. Third-party web content linked from a public entity’s website, unless the public entity uses the third-party web content to allow members of the public to participate in or benefit from the public entity’s services, programs, or activities.

Thoughts/takeaways/questions:

  1. The second clause is critical. That is, third-party web content has to be accessible to persons with disabilities if the third-party web content is being used to allow the members of the public to participate in or benefit from the public entity’s services, program, or activities.
  2. The DOJ specifically says when talking about this particular section that a public entity may not delegate away its obligations under the ADA. See also this blog entry.

(e) Public postsecondary institutions: password-protected course content. Except as provided in paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this section, course content available on a public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for admitted students enrolled in a specific course offered by a public postsecondary institution.

(1) This exception does not apply if a public entity is on notice that an admitted student with a disability is pre-registered in a specific course offered by a public postsecondary institution and that the student, because of a disability, would be unable to access the content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific course. In such circumstances, all content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific course must comply with the requirements of § 35.200 by the date the academic term begins for that course offering. New content added throughout the term for the course must also comply with the requirements of § 35.200 at the time it is added to the website.

(2) This exception does not apply once a public entity is on notice that an admitted student with a disability is enrolled in a specific course offered by a public postsecondary institution after the start of the academic term and that the student, because of a disability, would be unable to access the content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific course. In such circumstances, all content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific course must comply with the requirements of § 35.200 within five business days of such notice. New content added throughout the term for the course must also comply with the requirements of § 35.200 at the time it is added to the website.

(f) Public elementary and secondary schools: password-protected class or course content. Except as provided in paragraphs (f)(1) through (4) of this section, class or course content available on a public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for students enrolled, or parents of students enrolled, in a specific class or course at a public elementary or secondary school.

(1) This exception does not apply if the public entity is on notice of the following: a student with a disability is pre-registered in a specific class or course offered by a public elementary or secondary school and that the student, because of a disability, would be unable to access the content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course. In such circumstances, all content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course must comply with the requirements of § 35.200 by the date the term begins for that class or course. New content added throughout the term for the class or course must also comply with the requirements of § 35.200 at the time it is added to the website.

(2) This exception does not apply if the public entity is on notice of the following: a student is pre-registered in a public elementary or secondary school’s class or course, the student’s parent has a disability, and the parent, because of a disability, would be unable to access the content available on the password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course. In such circumstances, all content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course must comply with the requirements of § 35.200 by the date the term begins for that class or course. New content added throughout the term for the class or course must also comply with the requirements of § 35.200 at the time it is added to the website.

(3) This exception does not apply once a public entity is on notice of the following: a student with a disability is enrolled in a public elementary or secondary school’s class or course after the term begins and that the student, because of a disability, would be unable to access the content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course. In such circumstances, all content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course must comply with the requirements of § 35.200 within five business days of such notice. New content added throughout the term for the class or course must also comply with the requirements of § 35.200 at the time it is added to the website.

(4) This exception also does not apply once a public entity is on notice of the following: a student is enrolled in a public elementary or secondary school’s class or course after the term begins, and the student’s parent has a disability, and the parent, because of a disability, would be unable to access the content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course. In such circumstances, all content available on the public entity’s password-protected or otherwise secured website for the specific class or course must comply with the requirements of § 35.200 within five business days of such notice. New content added throughout the term for the class or course must also comply with the requirements of § 35.200 at the time it is added to the website.

(g) Individualized, password-protected documents. Conventional electronic documents that are: (1) about a specific individual, their property, or their account; and (2) password-protected or otherwise secured.

Thoughts/takeaways/questions:

  1. I find the password protection exceptions a bit strange because they go against the principles of universal design. Basically, if an educational institution has a password protection system in place, it doesn’t have to worry about accessibility for persons with disabilities so long as it is not on notice that a person with a disability is taking that class or needs that password. Same for parents. Universal design would suggest that you always focus on disability accessibility. It will be interesting to see how this plays out.
  2. The exception puts a premium on the person with the disability or the parent notifying the public entity of the need for an accommodation due to a disability. In dealing with this principle, remember magic words are not required.
  3. DOJ in their discussion of this particular section of the proposed rule talks about whether a person would be unable because of a disability to access the content posted on the password-protected website for that class or course. It goes on to say that the phrase “unable to access,” is intended to cover situations where a student’s disability would limit or prevent their ability to equally access the relevant content. DOJ also uses “on the basis of,” in this document as well. The two concepts arguably mean the same thing. See this blog entry.
  4. There are specific timing requirements as to when the material appearing in the password-protected course must be made accessible to persons with disabilities.

Conforming alternate versions.

  • A public entity may use conforming alternate versions of websites and web content, as defined by WCAG 2.1, to comply with § 35.200 only where it is not possible to make websites and web content directly accessible due to technical or legal limitations.

Thoughts/takeaways/questions:

  1. The DOJ makes clear that this is not a favored approach and should only be used rarely.
  2. Separate but equal is not a thing and DOJ recognizes that. See also this blog entry where the Department of Transportation specifically ruled out such an approach.
  3. This particular provision bears watching to see if separate but equal becomes a thing. DOJ actually has a specific question it seeks common on with respect to this issue (see the 60+ questions section below).

(b) WCAG 2.1 is incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved incorporation by reference (“IBR”) material is available for inspection at the U.S. Department of Justice and at the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”). Contact the U.S. Department of Justice at: Disability Rights Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 150 M St. NE, 9th Floor, Washington, DC 20002; ADA Information Line: (800) 514–0301 (voice) or 1–833–610–1264 (TTY); website: www.ada.gov. For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/​federal-register/​cfr/​ibr-locations.html or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. The material may be obtained from the World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C®”) Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), 401 Edgewater Place, Suite 600, Wakefield, MA 01880; phone: (339) 273–2711; email: contact@w3.org; website: www.w3.org/​TR/​2018/​REC-WCAG21-20180605/​ [ https://perma.cc/​UB8A-GG2F].

Equivalent facilitation.

Nothing in this subpart prevents the use of designs, methods, or techniques as alternatives to those prescribed, provided that the alternative designs, methods or techniques result in substantially equivalent or greater accessibility and usability of the web content or mobile app.

Duties.

Where a public entity can demonstrate that full compliance with the requirements of § 35.200 would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens, compliance with § 35.200 is required to the extent that it does not result in a fundamental alteration or undue financial and administrative burdens. In those circumstances where personnel of the public entity believe that the proposed action would fundamentally alter the service, program, or activity or would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, a public entity has the burden of proving that compliance with § 35.200 would result in such alteration or burdens. The decision that compliance would result in such alteration or burdens must be made by the head of a public entity or their designee after considering all resources available for use in the funding and operation of the service, program, or activity, and must be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for reaching that conclusion. If an action would result in such an alteration or such burdens, a public entity shall take any other action that would not result in such an alteration or such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity to the maximum extent possible.

 

Thoughts/takeaways/questions:

 

  1. When an individual on the basis of a disability cannot access or does not have equal access to a service, program, or activity through a public entity’s web content or mobile app that conform to WCAG 2.1 level AA, the public entity still has the obligation to provide the individual an alternative method of access to that service, program, or activity unless the public entity can demonstrate that the alternative methods of access results in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service, program, or activity or in an undue financial and administrative burden.
  2. Just because an entity is in full compliance with the rule’s web or mobile app accessibility standard, that does not mean it has met all of its obligations under the ADA or other applicable laws.
  3. Remember, the ADA always requires an individualized analysis.

 

III

60+ questions

 

  1. The proposed rule contains over 60 questions for people to comment on. The questions are quite elaborate. Accordingly, considering the thousands and thousands of comments likely to come in on this rule, the need for DOJ to evaluate those comments, and then the need to formulate a final rule based upon the comments that come in, one wonders whether this proposed rule will not suffer the same fate as the Obama proposed rules depending upon the 2024 election results. Is there simply enough time to complete the process? I am not so sure.
  2. Now is the time for anyone interested or affected by the proposed rule to get in their comments. You have 60 days from August 4 to submit those comments. Once a rule becomes finalized, it is much harder to affect the rule.
  3. The 60 questions include the following topics:
    1. Whether DOJ should craft a more flexible definition of what is a conventional electronic document or stick with their list, which is exhaustive and focuses on specific file types.
    2. Whether any refinement to the definition of web content is in order.
    3. Is there a technical standard or performance standard other than WCAG 2.1 that the DOJ should consider? (I am doubtful that such a thing exists unless you want to look to the European Union).
    4. What are the compliance costs and challenges that small public entities would face in conforming with the rule and what resources do such entities have to comply with the rule. A related question is whether a different WCAG version or conformance level should be required for small public entities or for a subset of such entities.
    5. How do public entities use social media platforms and how do members of the public use content made available by public entities on their social media platforms and what are the barriers people with disabilities encounter.
    6. Several questions going to the viability of the tiered approach to when entities must comply with the rule and whether something other than population size might be used as the standard.
    7. With respect to live audio content and captioning of same, whether the DOJ should consider a different compliance date. Also, what types of live audio content do public entities and small public entities post and what are the costs associated with same.
    8. How do public entity currently manage content maintained for reference, research, or record-keeping.
    9. What is the impact of the exceptions on people with disabilities and how will foreseeable advances in technology affect those exceptions.
    10. What types of external mobile apps if any, do public entities use to offer the services, programs and activities to members of the public, and how accessible are those apps. (For example, the town that I live in uses a third-party mobile parking app).
    11. Any issues relating to accessibility of digital books and textbooks that DOJ should consider when finalizing the rule. Any impact of the rule on libraries.
    12. With respect to the exceptions, how difficult is complying with the rule if the exceptions are not there at all.
    13. Just how far do educational institutions go with the utilization of password-protected websites and mobile apps with respect to students and parents. Several other related questions.
    14. Do elementary and secondary schools have a system allowing a parent with a disability to provide notice of their need for an accessible class or course content (they absolutely should if they don’t already).
    15. The kind of individualized conventional electronic document that public entities make available and how are they made available. What is the difficulty of making those documents accessible.
    16. How significant is the separate but equal risk.
    17. How is compliance to be measured. Are there particular approaches that are better than others.
    18. What should be considered sufficient evidence to support an allegation of noncompliance with the technical standard for purposes of enforcement actions and what should be considered in that process. A slew of related question regarding how actual compliance will be determined.

I

Supreme Court Update and Regulatory Developments

 

Before getting started on the blog entry for the week, there was some bizarre developments in the case of Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, which we discussed two weeks in a row here. The developments are very well described by the Seyfarth Shaw firm in their blog, here. It will be interesting to see whether the Supreme Court decides to proceed with the case anyway. If it does decide to proceed, it is unclear to me who would make the oral argument for the plaintiff since they have withdrawn from the case. Would the Supreme Court then decide the case on the briefs only? Stay tuned for further developments.

 

In other news, the Department of Transportation, here, issued a final rule with respect to wheelchairs on board planes (OBW-onboard wheelchairs), and the accessibility of lavatories on planes. That final rule can be found here. It is great to see these rules, and I know people using wheelchairs and even those in the vision loss community will benefit. It would be nice to see similar rules for the hearing loss community. For example, my options for watching entertainment on airplanes are far more limited than hearing people options are. Also, with the exception of the announcements about oxygen masks made at the beginning of the flight, I have no idea what the announcements actually are. I am left guessing. You would think with Wi-Fi rapidly becoming standard across the entire aircraft, that this would be a fixable issue.

 

Finally, the EEOC issued a guidance on visual disabilities in the workplace and the ADA, which can be found here. Eric Meyer in his Employer Handbook Blog, here, nicely summarizes the guidance very well. Two things about the guidance leapt out at me. First, I did not see anything goofy with this particular guidance the way I did with the EEOC hearing loss guidance, which we discussed here. However, I am not visually impaired or blind, so it is possible that I may have missed something. From reading the guidance, it is quite obvious that the EEOC either has substantial experience working with the blind and/or visually impaired or it consulted with people in that community, which cannot be said for the hearing loss guidance and the Deaf, deaf, and hearing loss community. Second, I noticed that the EEOC quite consistently talks about how you can only seek documentation where a disability is obvious. Seeing that formulation quite often caused me to do a deeper dive. When you do that, it turns out that what is “obvious,” is far from obvious. Accordingly, the best approach may very well be to let the obviousness of the disability dictate how much documentation is requested rather than use “obvious,” as a litmus test to decide whether documentation should be sought at all. Third, in the example DD of the guidance, the EEOC waffles a little bit about whether the ADA is a nondelegable duty. The safer approach is to assume that it is. Clearly plenty of case law says as much as does DOJ.

 

II

Case of the Week

 

This week’s blog entry isn’t something I have previously blogged on. For the litigators that are our readers and for any civil procedure geeks, this entry is for you. The case of the day is Jones v. L.A. Central Plaza, a published decision from the Ninth Circuit decided on July 26, 2023, here. As usual, the discussion dealing with the case of the week is divided into categories and they are: facts; how a case proceeds to the summary judgment stage; court’s reasoning that it is improper to convert a motion for summary judgment into a motion to dismiss; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts

 

Jones sued the defendant for architectural inaccessibility. For whatever reason, the defendant allowed the case to proceed through the summary judgment stage. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which is a bit unusual in and of itself, and defendant didn’t explicitly respond to the motion to summary judgment in terms of replying to the motion to summary judgment. Instead, they said that the case should be dismissed. The district court in deciding the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its own motion, decided to convert the motion into a motion to dismiss and assess whether the plaintiff met the standards of Iqbal/Twombly. It decided that plaintiff did not and threw out the case. It also denied a hypothetical leave to amend the complaint because the deadline to amend the complaint under the court’s rule 16 pretrial scheduling order have long passed. Plaintiff appealed saying that the judge could not work backwards that way. After all, the plaintiff claimed he had, and confirmed by the court’s own admission, developed evidence that would flush out any deficiencies with Iqbal/Twombly. So, the judge should have considered that evidence as part of the motion for summary judgment process.

 

II

How a case proceeds to the Summary Judgment Stage

 

  1. In order for a plaintiff to show standing under article III, a plaintiff has to show: 1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is A) concrete and particularized and B) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and 3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
  2. Satisfying the standing elements must be done in the manner and the degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation. That is, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that if taken as true demonstrate each element of standing. If the plaintiff does not do that, the complaint is subject to dismissal at the outset either upon motion by the defendant or on the court’s own motion. If the complaint’s factual allegations of article III standing are found to be adequate under Iqbal/Twombly or are not challenged at the outset by either the parties or the court, then the case proceeds to discovery for the parties to marshal evidence supporting their claims and defenses. During or after that process, either party can move for summary judgment, which requires a district court to enter judgment on a claim or defense if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
  3. At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff has to offer evidence and specific facts demonstrating each element of standing.

 

III

Court’s Reasoning That the District Court Cannot Work Backwards and Convert a Motion for Summary Judgment into a Motion to Dismiss.

 

  1. In the adversarial system of the United States, it is generally up to the parties to decide, within the parameters of the applicable procedural rules, what relief they wish to seek, what type of motion they wish to present to obtain that relief, and the arguments they wish to make in support.
  2. Standing issues can be raised on the court’s own motion at any time.
  3. After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, a court may grant summary judgment for a movant, grant a summary judgment motion on grounds not raised by a party, or even ask the parties in the absence of a motion, to address the propriety of granting summary judgment on grounds identified by the court.
  4. When presented with matters outside the pleadings in connection with the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for judgment on the pleadings, the district court may choose to exclude extrinsic matters and address the motion under applicable motion to dismiss standards. It could also convert the motion into one for summary judgment.
  5. In this case, the district court effectively did the reverse whereby it converted a motion for summary judgment into a motion to dismiss. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer no support for such a conversion and is improper in most cases, if not virtually all.
  6. Converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment can make sense because it allows for a prompt and efficient means of achieving a definitive resolution of a case dispositive issue based on an evidentiary record adequate for that specific purpose.
  7. A reverse conversion employed by the district court in this case goes against the principles of sound case management in many ways. For example, such a reverse conversion unjustifiably ignores the fuller evidentiary record assembled by the parties after they have already incurred the expense of discovery. Also, one of the chief objectives of Iqbal/Twombly is to avoid unlocking the doors of discovery for plaintiffs armed with nothing more than conclusions.
  8. The practical effect of a reverse conversion on the outcome of a summary judgment motion makes little sense. For example, suppose that the summary judgment record shows that the plaintiff has raised sufficient evidence of standing to allow or even to compel a trier of fact to decide in its favor with respect to standing. In that situation, dismissing the case based upon Iqbal/Twombly pleading deficiencies in the complaint changes the outcome in a way that is difficult to justify. In such a scenario, the litigation process reveals that the pleading deficiency is curable because the actual facts developed by the party shows that the plaintiff has enough proof to proceed, and that the evidence provided a roadmap for curing any overlooked Iqbal/Twombly deficiency in the complaint’s factual allegations.
  9. There is no possible justification for raising a purely technical pleading deficiency that the defendant never saw fit to raise. Had the defendant challenged the adequacy of the complaint’s factual allegations through a timely motion to dismiss per Iqbal/Twombly, those deficiencies presumably could have been cured before the allotted time to amend the pleadings had expired.
  10. A district court ignoring the parties factual presentation on summary judgment and instead insisting on raising on its own motion and un-objected to but potentially curable deficiency only after the time to amend has expired, hardly seems to promote a just determination of the action.
  11. A reverse conversion sets up a system whereby the ultimate outcome is not changed or the outcome is changed in a way that is exceedingly difficult to justify. Either way, it makes little sense not to simply decide the issues as the parties present them.
  12. The district court provided no notice to the parties that it was contemplating such a reverse conversion. A reverse conversion is problematic enough and especially so without notifying the parties of what is going to happen. The lack of notice also raises due process and fairness concerns.
  13. Where a court does decide to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, by rule the court must afford all parties a reasonable opportunity to present all the material pertinent to the motion. The same should have happened with respect to the reverse conversion.
  14. While it is true that a district court has the power and obligation to reach jurisdictional issues such as standing on its own motion, that does not mean that it has the discretion later in the litigation, to retroactively examine the adequacy of the complaint’s factual allegations of standing under Iqbal/Twombly.
  15. When a court issues a post pleading date order to establish article III standing, the applicable standards are presumptively those governing summary judgment motion rather than those governing motions to dismiss.
  16. When the parties have briefed and argued a summary judgment motion, judicial efficiency is best served by dealing directly with those arguments rather than avoiding them.
  17. In the ordinary case, no justification exists for allowing a district court to travel back in time and train the lens of its inquiry on the bare allegations of the complaint while disregarding the factual record upon which a summary judgment movement has elected to rely.
  18. The record confirms the impropriety of the district court’s manner of proceeding. In fact, the district court itself said that Jones had provided facts that could demonstrate standing with his motion for summary judgment, but nevertheless inexplicably chose to ignore those facts and instead to evaluate the situation on Iqbal/Twombly grounds without even giving any notice that it planned to dispose of the case in such a novel and unjustifiable manner.

 

 

III

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. While a motion to dismiss can occasionally be converted into a motion for summary judgment, this case illustrates that it doesn’t work the other way around for the reasons very well explained by the court.
  2. Iqbal/Twombly is not an easy standard for a plaintiff to meet. The best way to explain the ability to meet such a standard would be to allege enough facts so that a reasonable person would be on notice as to exactly what happened. The notice pleading standard that many of us learned in law school simply doesn’t exist, especially for disability discrimination cases. That said, it isn’t entirely all fact-based either. You want to put in enough facts so that is absolutely clear that all the elements of standing or of the particular claim alleged have been satisfied. Illinois courts have taken this approach for years.
  3. The language of the opinion is pretty stern and it is also a published decision. Accordingly, I don’t anticipate many trial judges in the future trying a reverse conversion like this one did.
  4. It is unusual for a plaintiff to file a motion for summary judgment, at least with the expectation that they would have a realistic chance of winning. It is far more typical for a defendant to file a motion for summary judgment and then for a plaintiff to either contest it or file a cross motion for summary judgment.
  5. Since Iqbal/Twombly is not an easy standard to meet, the defendant will most of the time file a motion to dismiss after the complaint has been filed. There are times when a defendant does not do that. In that situation or in the event a motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant just about always will file a motion for summary judgment at the pertinent time.
  6. How a judge deals with a summary judgment motion varies considerably from judge to judge. Some judges use it as a screen out for all but the very good cases. Other judges look for genuine issues of material fact and let a jury decide. Since very few cases go to jury, the motion for summary judgment pretty much dictates the whole case moving forward. That is, if the motion is granted to the defense, the case is dismissed. If the motion is not granted to the defense, the case invariably settles.
Green ADA lettering with pink squiggly background on a board with super large 3 of spades and 3 of diamonds playing cards glued on at upper left.
Happy 33 ADA

I wanted to get up a blog entry today because it is the 33rd anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Happy birthday!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

A short blog entry for today. It is possible I might have another blog entry this week that would be more detailed on something, but I wanted to be sure to get a blog entry up today. So here goes. It is a very short triple play so to speak, so you will not see the typical categories that my blog entries are divided into.

 

I

DOJ Title II Web Accessibility and Mobile Accessibility Rules Are Imminent.

 

Yesterday, DOJ announced that it has submitted a proposed rule to the Federal Register discussing their view of what title II websites for both the PC and mobile/cell phones might look like in terms of regulatory requirements to achieve meaningful accessibility for persons with disabilities. You can bet that will be a blog entry of mine when it comes out and no doubt will be widely blogged on by others.

 

II

 

Arizona State Law Prohibiting Transgender Girls from Participating in Athletics Thrown out with Respect to Transgender Girls Never Having Gone through Puberty.

 

In Doe v. Horne, here, Judge Zipps of the Arizona District Court held that the Arizona law prohibiting transgender girls from participating in sports where those girls have not gone through puberty or never will, violated the Constitution as well as title IX of the Civil Rights Act. The judge said that there was no rational basis for disallowing such individuals to participate in sports let alone any basis rising to the level of heightened scrutiny. The critical feature here is that all of the plaintiffs were transgender girls yet to go through puberty or were taking hormone blockers so that they never would go through puberty. An appeal has already been filed with the Ninth Circuit. It will be interesting to see what the Ninth Circuit does and ultimately how the Supreme Court deals with this.

 

III

 

In Deciding Whether a Person Is Entitled to SSDI, How a Service Animal Ameliorates the Individual’s Situation Cannot Be Factored in to That Decision

 

In Bryan H. v. Kijakazi, here, United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Gilbert remanded a case back to the Administrative Law Judge because the Administrative Law Judge failed to remove from her analysis of whether the claimant was entitled to SSDI benefits, the fact that the plaintiff needed a service animal in order to do certain jobs and even function in society. As we discussed here, SSDI does not factor in accommodations into deciding whether a person is entitled to benefits. My thanks to Prof. Leonard Sandler, a Clinical Law Professor at the University of Iowa, for sending me the Bryan H. case.

 

Happy birthday ADA!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

Stay cool everyone.

Today’s blog entry is on a topic that we have not previously discussed before or certainly we have not discussed much. The topic is §508 of the Rehabilitation Act. Otherwise known as 29 U.S.C. §794d. Case of the day is Orozco v. Merrick Garland decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on February 17, 2023, here. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories- with the exception of the last section the blog, the categories track the layout of the opinion-, and they are: introduction to §508; facts; court’s reasoning that §794d(f)(3) provides a private cause of action after exhaustion of administrative remedies; and my thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Introduction to §508

 

  1. In 1986, Congress required agencies to buy technology that employees with disability could use without needing special adaptive devices.
  2. In 1992, Congress broadened the definition of accessibility by requiring agencies buying technology to give users with and without disabilities comparable access to information and data.
  3. In 1998, Congress extended the comparable access mandate to a broader range of activities, i.e. developing, procuring, maintaining, or using technology. Congress also clarified the duty that providing comparable access obligation runs to individuals with disabilities who either are federal employees or members of the public seeking information or services.
  4. Also in 1998, Congress added an enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism allows any individual with a disability to file an internal administrative complaint with the relevant agency. 29 U.S.C. §794d(f)(1)(A). If such a complaint is filed, Congress required the agency to address it using its procedures for discrimination in federally funded programs rather than its procedures for employment discrimination.
  5. The enforcement mechanism, through a series of statutory cross references, allows any individual filing an internal administrative complaint about inaccessible technology to utilize remedies and rights set forth in 29 U.S.C. §794a(a)(2). That section in turn makes the remedies, procedures, and rights contained in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 available to persons aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of federal assistance or federal provider of such assistance.
  6. In other words: 1) title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 creates a cause of action to challenge race, color, or national origin discrimination in federally funded programs; 2) §794a(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act extend the same cause of action that title VI provides to persons aggrieved by disability discrimination in federally funded programs; and 3) §794d(f)(3) extends that same cause of action to anyone filing an administrative complaint about inaccessible technology under §794d.

 

II

Facts (taken directly from the opinion)

 

Jahinnslerth Orozco joined the FBI as an intelligence analyst in 2012. Because he is blind, Orozco relies on screen access software that “converts visual screen information into synthesized speech or into braille” to perform his job. Compl. ¶ 2, J.A. 8. 1

 

Such screen access tools, though, can be foiled by poor software design. For example, if a website includes an arrow button, its function might be obvious to a sighted user but difficult for screen access software to navigate without an alternative text description.

 

In April 2019, Orozco filed a complaint with the Assistant Attorney General for Administration at the Department of Justice, which oversees the FBI, alleging that the FBI had failed to deploy accessible technology in his workplace. The Assistant Attorney General for Administration generally handles complaints about discrimination in programs funded by the Department of Justice, and therefore is responsible for handling complaints about inaccessible technology. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 39.170(d)(4), 42.2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 794d(f)(2). To be 1 Because this case arises from a ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we take as true the facts from Orozco’s first amended complaint and “matters of which we may take judicial notice,” and we “construe the facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from them, in the light most favorable” to Orozco. Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287, 293 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 6 on the safe side, Orozco sent copies of his administrative complaint to both the FBI’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office, which handles employment discrimination complaints, and the FBI’s Chief Information Officer, which is responsible for procuring accessible technology. Orozco’s filing expressly reminded the FBI that it should handle his complaint using its procedures governing discrimination in federally funded programs. Compl. Letter 1–2, J.A. 29–30.

 

The FBI nonetheless routed Orozco’s complaint through its employee-discrimination process. See Letter from Arlene A. Gaylord to Timothy R. Elder (May 9, 2019), J.A. 33–35 (invoking 29 C.F.R. Part 1614’s employment discrimination procedures). Orozco once again filed his complaint with the Office of the Chief Information Officer, but he never received any response from that Office. Instead, the FBI’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office dismissed the complaint “for failure to state a claim of [employment] discrimination[.]” Letter from Richard Toscano to Timothy R. Elder (Aug. 7, 2019), J.A. 20. In the same letter, the FBI advised Orozco to contact the Office of the Chief Information Officer—which he had already done twice. Id.; see also Decl. Albert Elia Supp. Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ¶¶ 6, 10–13, J.A. 26– 27.

 

Three months after his administrative complaint was dismissed, and having received no further communications from the FBI, Orozco filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. His complaint reasserted the same violations of Section 794d(a) as his administrative filings, and it sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General, who oversees the FBI. See Compl. ¶¶ (a)–(h), J.A. 15–16

 

The district court granted the FBI’s motion to dismiss. While recognizing “the challenges Mr. Orozco faces at his workplace,” the district court held that Section 794d(f)(3) “does not provide a cause of action” because it incorporates only the right to sue a “federal provider of * * * assistance” created by Section 794a(a)(2), and the FBI is not a federal provider of assistance when acting as an employer. Orozco v. Garland, No. 19–3336, 2021 WL 4502072, at *4–6 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2021). In a footnote, the district court declined to pass on the government’s separate argument that Orozco had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at *6 n.3.

 

III

Court’s Reasoning That §794d(f)(3) Does Provide a Private Cause of Action after Exhausting Administrative Remedies

 

  1. 794d(f)(3) adopts the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in §794a(a)(2). The provision then expressly defines to whom those remedies, procedures, and rights shall be available as being an individual with a disability filing a complaint under §794d(f)(1).
  2. 794a(a)(2) incorporates a set of remedies and rights found elsewhere-specifically in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This particular section likewise separately defines to whom those rights are available as any person aggrieved by any recipient of federal assistance or federal provider of such assistance.
  3. While both §794d and §794a adopt the same enforcement remedies, rights, and procedures, they each independently define who gets to invoke those provisions to enforce the duty that each Section independently imposes.
  4. The Supreme Court has held that while §794a(a)(2) expressly incorporates title VI’s rights, remedies, and procedures-including its cause of action-§794a(a)(2) does not carry forward title VI’s separate definition of who can sue under that cause of action. Instead, its own definition of who is an authorized plaintiff governs.
  5. Congress must be taken at its word that when it incorporates the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in another part of the Rehabilitation Act. This section of the Rehabilitation Act does that and no more.
  6. Congress created the cause of action to enforce the technology accessibility requirements of §794d. If Congress had meant also to incorporate §794a’s limits on who may sue, Congress would have said so. It didn’t do that. So, §794d(f)(3)’s own definition of qualifying plaintiff’s-any individual with a disability filing a complaint about technology accessibility-controls. Accordingly, Orozco can file suit.
  7. Orozco having the ability to file suit is a commonsense conclusion that gives the most natural meaning to each of the words Congress used in §794d((f)(3). That section says that the remedies, procedures, and rights in §794a(a)(2) are available to any individual with a disability filing an administrative complaint. Orozco certainly is an individual with a disability, and as an employee is one of the statutorily specified individuals who compiled the requisite administrative complaint about technology accessibility in the workplace. Holding that one section takes away what another section plainly grants puts the statute at war with itself and makes no sense.
  8. The district court’s reading of the statute appears to leave no one capable of using the rights, remedies, and procedures that §794d(f)(3) goes to all the trouble of adopting. In particular, this section if directed exclusively at inward facing activities, such as developing, procuring, maintaining, or using accessible technology within an agency.
  9. At oral argument, the government conceded that its reading of §794d(f)(3) does not leave any class of plaintiffs with a clear right to sue. Reading a statute expressly authorizing civil actions to authorize no civil actions renders that provision a nullity.
  10. The substantive protections of §794d apply equally to federal employees and to members of the public seeking information or services. All members of both groups are equally entitled to submit administrative complaints. Nothing in the substantive or remedial provisions of §794d even suggests that Congress meant to allow enforcement rights to members of the public seeking assistance, while deliberately withholding any such remedy from employees-especially when that leaves nobody able to sue. For that matter, nothing in the legislative history, executive interpretation, or purpose of this section supports the district court’s reasoning.
  11. The contemporaneous Executive Branch interpretation of §794d was exactly the opposite of the government’s current position. In 1999, the Atty. Gen. interpreted this section to authorize private lawsuits by employees and members of the public. It makes perfect sense that Congress decided not to incorporate the remedies section of §794a(a)(1) addressing employment discrimination lawsuit by federal employees because Congress specifically forbade agencies from treating administrative complaints about inaccessible technology as if they were about employment discrimination rather than about the failure to ensure federal funds are used in a nondiscriminatory manner.
  12. A violation of §794d does not resemble employment discrimination in any relevant respect.
  13. Congress’s purpose with §794d was to spur the innovative use of accessible technology by federal agencies. So, an agency can violate this section by failing to use available accessible technology regardless of whether the situation has anything to do with employment.
  14. The sovereign immunity argument doesn’t wash, because Congress has waived sovereign immunity when it comes to relief seeking other things than money damages, which is the case here.
  15. With respect to exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is unnecessary to decide it because it doesn’t affect the district court’s jurisdiction over the case. Orozco’s filing a complaint twice is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Since any remaining exhaustion issues are not jurisdictional, it is up to the district court to address the question of a exhaustion on remand.
  16. Congress amended §794d to make sure that agencies would fulfill their responsibility to procure technology allowing employees with disabilities to participate fully in the workplace. To enforce that duty, Congress expressly provided a private right of action to any individual with a disability, including a federal employee, who first files an administrative complaint about inaccessible technology

 

IV

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. A party has 90 days to seek cert. from the Supreme Court. As far as I can tell, no such petition was filed in this case.
  2. Even if cert. was sought, I am not aware of a United States Court of Appeals split on this issue. It will be interesting to see whether the circuit courts do split on this question. I am not sure they will as the reasoning of this case seems pretty solid. Also, the blowback from disability rights community for the government seeking cert. would be fierce. Since I don’t recall any such blowback occurring and the time for seeking review from the Supreme Court has passed, that makes me believe that Supreme Court review was not sought.
  3. Administrative exhaustion is required.
  4. The case is very significant because it creates a private cause of action, admittedly one for injunctive relief due to sovereign immunity, on behalf of a member of the public or an employee of the federal government who runs into an issue with the technology being utilized by the federal government being inaccessible to them. As a result, tester standing may become an issue. For a discussion of tester standing, see this blog entry for example.
  5. Attorney fees are available for §794d suits per §794a(b).

It has been a while since I blogged on the ADA with respect to amusement parks. On July 7, 2023, the 11th Circuit in a published decision came down with a case discussing the ADA with respect to amusement parks. Among the topics discussed are the screen out provisions and direct threat. The case has wider implications as well. The case is Campbell v. Universal Partners, here. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; ADA provisions involved; burden of proof; just what does necessary/necessity mean; complying with state law is not sufficient to activate the necessity defense; comparative advantage is not sufficient to activate the necessity defense; administrative feasibility and uniformity v. necessary; and thoughts/takeaways. As usual, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts

 

Dylan Campbell was born with only one hand. It was hot, so he took his son to Universal’s Volcano Bay Waterpark and got in line to ride a waterslide version of a roller coaster. As he approached the front of the line, Universal pulled him aside and told him he was unfit to ride the ride. Universal did not allow people without two natural hands to ride that ride. Campbell then sued alleging a discriminatory eligibility criterion in violation of the ADA.

 

During the litigation, Universal stipulated that the manufacturer of the ride had identified no specific risks of riding to anyone like Campbell. However, due to a series of Florida laws, regulations, rules, and industry practices, Universal had no choice but to follow the manufacturer of the ride recommendations regardless of whether the manufacturer based those requirements on actual risks, speculation, or even discrimination.

 

II

ADA Provisions Involved

 

  1. Under title III of the ADA, discrimination includes, per 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i), the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. So, the general rule is that places of public accommodations are prohibited from imposing eligibility criteria that tend to preclude those with disabilities from enjoying the public accommodation’s good or service.
  2. A public accommodation can impose discriminatory eligibility criteria if such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered- the necessity exception.
  3. The ADA does not define what it means by, “necessary.”
  4. The ADA, per 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(D)(i), also prohibits public accommodations from avoiding liability under the ADA through contractual delegation. It expressly states that public accommodation cannot directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of administration having the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.
  5. The ADA also has a relationship to other laws provisions. That section, 42 U.S.C. §12201(b), provides that nothing in it should be construed to invalidate the remedies, rights, and procedures of any federal law or law of any State providing greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities. So, the ADA establishes the floor for the rights of persons with disabilities, but it does not limit the ceiling.

 

II

Burden of Proof

 

  1. In a case like this, plaintiff has the initial burden to show that: 1) he or she has a disability; 2) the defendant is a place of public accommodation; the defendant imposed eligibility criterion that screened out or tended to screen out an individual with a disability. Once the plaintiff shows this, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the eligibility criterion is necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered.
  2. This burden shifting is consistent with both the statute, per 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i), and with how courts have interpreted parallel clauses of 42 USC § 12182(b)(2)(A).
  3. In §12182(b)(2)(a)(ii), the defendant private entity bears the burden of proof on the fundamental alteration inquiry. §12182(b)(2)(a)(iii), requires provisions of auxiliary aids and services unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature to facilities being offered or would result in an undue burden. While the 11th Circuit has not interpreted this section of the ADA, other circuits have. Without exception, those circuits have held that public accommodations bear the burden of proving either a fundamental alteration or an undue burden.
  4. The 11th Circuit has noted the same type of analysis for title II cases whereby if a plaintiff makes an initial showing of disparate treatment under the FHA or the ADA, the burden of going forward shifted to the defendant to establish the differential treatment is justified.
  5. This burden shifting analysis makes sense on several levels. First, the public accommodation or public entity is in a unique and far better position than the plaintiff to know why compliance fundamentally alters the nature of the facility it offers or why differential treatment would be justified, or whether such an eligibility criteria is necessary.
  6. Whether 1) a certain requirement is necessary to the facility; or 2) changing the requirement would fundamentally alter the defendant’s facility; or 3) differential treatment is justified turns on fact uniquely in the defendant’s position. That is, all of those determinations go to the core of the facility offered by the defendant. Further, it is the public accommodation or public entity with the incentive to show why noncompliance would be necessary and why compliance fundamentally alters the nature of what is being offered, or why compliance results in an undue burden.
  7. The sections of the ADA dealing with architectural barriers and the whole concept of readily achievable are not applicable to this kind of case. Architectural barriers present a different kind of situation so it makes sense that the way the courts have looked at burden shifting in those cases is different than what it would be in this case.
  8. Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(i) has to be read so that the burden is on the public accommodation to show that discrimination is necessary where a plaintiff makes the requisite initial showing. Plaintiff made that initial showing because everybody agrees that Campbell has a disability and that Volcano Bay is a place of public accommodation. Also, Universal hasn’t contacted that it’s two hands eligibility criterion screens out or tends to screen out persons with disabilities. Universal therefore forfeited any argument otherwise.

 

III

Just What Does Necessary/Necessity Mean

 

  1. Necessary does include discriminatory eligibility criteria imposed to ensure safety.
  2. A prohibition is necessary if it is required for legitimate safety reasons.
  3. The ADA does not define, “necessary.”
  4. The ordinary meaning of “necessary,” doesn’t provide much guidance either. At best, all that can be said is the eligibility criteria must be in some way “essential,” or “cannot be avoided,” and offering a facility.
  5. A criteria providing a safe user experience is essential in offering a facility for public use because a public accommodation would go out of business quickly if the facilities and offered to the public were dangerous.
  6. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(3) specifies that nothing requires an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the facilities of such entity where that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. That provision continues to say that the term direct threat means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policy, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services. Therefore, it is fair to say that congressional intent includes the safety of others as being necessary.
  7. It is not a far leap to conclude that the customer’s own safety is likewise necessary (see the thoughts/takeaways section of this blog entry for my strong disagreement with this particular conclusion of the court).
  8. 28 C.F.R. §36.301(b) provides that public accommodations may impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for safe operation.
  9. Legitimate safety requirements must be based upon actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.
  10. “Necessary,” can include more than what is required for safety. Nothing in title III suggest that the general definition of “necessary,” is limited to just safety. Even the DOJ regulation says that safety is a permissible justification for discriminatory eligibility criterion and does not say that it is the only permissible justification.

 

IV

 

Complying with State Law Is Not Sufficient to Activate the Necessary Defense

 

  1. Florida law requires amusement park to comply with ASTM standards. ASTM standards in turn demand compliance with manufacturer recommendations. Here, the manufacturer says that Campbell can’t ride because he doesn’t have two hands.
  2. The texts of the ADA precludes a court from finding that it is necessary to comply with state law when state law otherwise requires a public accommodation to violate the ADA. Such an argument conflicts with the ADA’s non-preemption provision when state law requires less discrimination protection for those with a disability than does the ADA. The ADA explicitly provides, per 42 U.S.C. §12201(b), that the ADA does not preempt state laws providing greater protection for persons with disabilities. Therefore, a state law providing less protection than the ADA to those with disabilities is preempted by the ADA. A state law at odds with a valid act of Congress is no law at all.
  3. Even apart from the ADA’s preemption provision, Universal’s construction of the ADA does not make any sense. Congress passed a sweeping law prohibiting discrimination unless discrimination is necessary. If compliance with state law were necessary, then any State could unilaterally nullify the ADA by enacting a state law requiring discrimination, which can’t possibly be right.
  4. If all state laws were insulated from title II’s reasonable modification requirement solely because they were state laws, state law would be an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting title II. The same analysis applies to title III.
  5. If a state imposed a requirement on businesses related to legitimate safety concerns, then compliance with that state law is necessary. However, compliance would be necessary because the rule promoted safety and not because the rule was a state law.
  6. Defendant’s argument that they will face criminal and civil penalties if they don’t have this eligibility criterion, simply does not fly in light of the supremacy clause. If a federal law requires Universal to allow Campbell to ride and state law prohibits it, then Universal must let Campbell ride. In other words, a discriminatory state law is not a defense to liability under federal law, rather it is a source of liability under federal law. If Florida were to seek an enforcement action or a declaratory judgment against Universal, Universal would be able to assert the ADA as a defense. In short, federal law trumps state law when the two conflict.
  7. When Justice Gorsuch was on the 10th Circuit, he stated that state officials relying on their compliance with discriminatory state laws as evidence of the reasonableness will normally find themselves proving their own liability and not shielding themselves from it. So, ADA liability does not get excused where discriminatory eligibility criteria exists because of state law.

 

V

Comparative Advantage Is Not Sufficient to Activate the Necessary Defense

 

  1. The mere fact that a manufacturer has more experience and therefore a comparative advantage in identifying safety risks does not make complying with the recommendations necessary when those recommendations are not in fact based upon actual risks.
  2. Only safety requirements addressing actual (emphasis in opinion), safety risks are necessary under the ADA.
  3. Congress enacted the ADA to address disability discrimination based upon stereotypes about disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a). So, it is not surprising that the ADA expressly prohibits discrimination against people “with disabilities” and those perceived as having a physical or mental impairment regardless of whether the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. §12102(3)(A).
  4. Stereotypes about what people with disabilities can or cannot do not justify exclusion under the ADA.
  5. A manufacturer imposed safety requirement is necessary only to the extent that it is related to actual risks to the health and safety of guests.
  6. A safety requirement imposed because of stereotypes is not necessary within the meaning of the ADA in light of how the ADA defines a disability. So, a manufacturer’s eligibility requirement, without more-i.e. based upon actual safety risks-does not qualify as necessary just because a manufacturer has a comparative advantage compared to a public accommodation in designing eligibility requirements.
  7. 28 C.F.R. §36.301(b) provides that safety requirements must be based upon actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.
  8. The hazard analysis reveals no actual risks to people like Campbell. In fact, the parties stipulated that aside from identifying one risk involving a potential hazard for visually impaired patrons, the hazard analysis performed by two different entities identified no specific risks for anyone with a limp difference or other physical disability. Based upon the parties stipulation, the recommendation made to the manufacturer identified no safety related justification. Universal also does not suggest a different reason for why the recommendation of the manufacturer that such an inclusion was necessary.

 

VI

Administrative Feasibility and Uniformity v. Necessary

 

  1. Universal’s claim that making particularized safety determinations about the inability or ability of the guests to safely ride is administratively infeasible is overstated in light of the record. That is, at this point in the case, Universal has not shown that administrative feasibility is relevant.
  2. Universal stipulated that aside from identifying one risk involving a potential hazard for visually impaired patrons, the hazard analysis identified no specific risks for anyone with a limp difference or other physical disability. So, it isn’t as though actual risks for people with certain limb differences were found and that risks specific to those with other types of limb differences being cost prohibitive existed. Instead, Universal stipulated that no specific risk for anyone with a limp difference was identified at all. Further, how a risk to a visually impaired rider has any relevance to a risk for those with limb differences is not self-explanatory.

 

VII

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. I strenuously disagree that it is not a far leap to include that direct threat to others also includes direct threat to self. If the DOJ felt that it did, it could have adopted the EEOC view of direct threat, which includes both direct threat to others and to self. See Chevron v. Echazabal, here. In fact, the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Echazabal, on page 82 of the opinion, specifically mentioned that DOJ and other agencies decided not to include direct threat to self in its regulations. They make a similar comment about Health, Education, And Welfare final implementing regulations in footnote 4 of that opinion. So, it simply is too far of a leap to assume that direct threat to others also includes direct threat to self. The distinction matters a great deal. The last couple years of my practice has seen me become involved in medical licensing matters whereby medical licensing boards via PHP’s attempt to force out persons with disabilities from healthcare professions on the basis of their disabilities. An issue that comes up frequently in those cases is the distinction between direct threat to others v. direct threat to self and others. From reading Chevron v. Echazabal, DOJ and other regulatory entities would have been perfectly within their rights to also include direct threat to self but they did not do so.
  2. This case has much wider implications than just amusement parks. As I mentioned above, in the licensing field “ability to practice safely,” arises frequently. This opinion emphatically says that the standard is direct threat and that any threat involving safety requirements must be legitimate safety requirements based upon actual risks and not upon stereotypes.
  3. The necessity defense is an affirmative defense. That is, the defendant has the burden of showing that an eligibility criteria that screens out persons with disabilities is necessary.
  4. Safety can be necessary with respect eligibility criteria but the criteria must be legitimate safety requirements based upon actual risks.
  5. It is possible that eligibility criteria besides a safety base criteria, that screen out people with disabilities could be necessary. It would be up to the defendant to show that such is the situation.
  6. Compliance with State law that discriminates against persons with disabilities is not by itself sufficient to activate the necessary defense. The supremacy clause simply won’t permit that.
  7. It isn’t unusual for Circuit Court opinions to cite to a lower court opinion by a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court. I view that as a situation where the appellate court is trying to add persuasiveness to its opinion and also telegraphing to a Justice on the Supreme Court that they should be aware of something they said previously if such a case comes up the Supreme Court.
  8. Manufacturers have an obligation to make sure that if they suggest our riders with disabilities be excluded from certain rides, they have objective evidence to show actual risks. An amusement park operator blindly relying on manufacturer’s guidance, when the manufacturer did nothing to figure out what actual risks were based upon scientific evidence, will not protect the amusement park from ADA liability.

I hope everyone had a Fourth of July weekend that was fantastic and safe.

 

Our blog entry for the week is a case that we have blogged on before. It asks the question of whether a claim of morbid obesity requires an underlying physical impairment or mental impairment or is just the claim of morbid obesity as a scientific standard is sufficient by itself. As we discussed previously, here, a Court of Appeals in Texas had held that morbid obesity by itself was sufficient to be able to claim protection under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). We also blogged here where the Washington Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. The Texas case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas (Texas actually has two Supreme Courts-one for civil cases and one for criminal cases). The Supreme Court of Texas winds up deciding that the trend of cases at the federal level where morbid obesity claims require an underlying physical or mental impairment is the correct way to go. The decision was 7-2 with two Justices concurring and two Justices dissenting. As a preliminary matter, Texas does waive sovereign immunity in cases like this, but the waiver depends upon essentially getting by, for lack of a better word, a summary judgment motion first, i.e. having to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. As usual, the case is divided into categories and they are: Facts; Justice Hecht majority opinion; Justice Blacklock concurring opinion; Justice Boyd dissenting opinion; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

 

Facts:

 

The facts of this case are quite egregious and can be found in great detail in the opinion, here. Basically, you have a medical resident that weighed over 400 pounds. The program where she was doing a residency at did not appreciate that. She had a particular problem with the person who ran the residency program, an interim director. At one point, the interim director actually went into the University legal counsel’s office to figure out whether she could terminate the resident because of the plaintiff’s weight. The lawyer for the school said that she could not terminate based upon that reason because it would be discrimination. After hearing that, she repeated to the attorney that she believed that the resident was not performing well because of her weight and that she needed to find another reason to terminate her from the program. The University did not take steps to protect the information from when the program director consulted legal counsel when it was revealed what the nature of that conversation was at the program director’s deposition. She filed a claim with the Texas Workforce Commission and the EEOC and then upon receiving a right to sue letter brought suit. Her claim was that she was dismissed as a result of her morbid obesity. However, she never claimed either in her complaint or in her deposition any underlying physical or mental impairment associated with the morbid obesity. She also originally brought both an actual disability claim and a regarded as claim. However, on appeal, she abandoned the actual disability claim and proceeded only under the regarded as claim.

 

I

Justice Hecht Majority Opinion

 

  1. In 1993, the Texas legislature amended the TCHRA to bring it into compliance with the ADA. That enactment modified the definition of disability contained in the TCHRA to conform with the ADA definition.
  2. The definition of disability under the ADA at the time the TCHRA was amended is essentially the same as it is today. Both definitions call for a physical or mental impairment.
  3. At the time the TCHRA was amended, the final implementing federal regulations defined an impairment as, “any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.” It can be presumed that the Texas legislature was aware of its regulatory interpretation and was accepting of that meaning of impairment when it adopted the ADA definition of disability.
  4. Since the TCHRA express purpose is to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in title I of the ADA and its subsequent amendments, the interpretation of the definition of disability is guided by both federal court decisions interpreting the ADA and the federal administrative regulations regarding the ADA.
  5. The federal regulatory definition of impairment today is not that much different from the definition in 1993. Today, per 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h),an impairment is, “any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disparagement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.”
  6. The plain language of both the 1993 and the current definition of impairment in the final implementing regulations require a physiological disorder or condition in order to find an impairment.
  7. Weight, even when it is outside the normal range, is not a physiological disorder or condition, rather it is a physical characteristic. The mere physical characteristic does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder. So, a plaintiff has to be able to point to a physiological disorder or condition causing one’s weight in order to show an impairment.
  8. The parties appear to agree that obesity is not an impairment absent evidence of an underlying physiological disorder or condition. So, it would make no sense to require an underlying physiological disorder or condition for morbid obesity but not for obesity.
  9. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all concluded that the plain language of the EEOC regulation compels the conclusion that morbid obesity must stem from a physiological disorder or condition in order to qualify as an impairment for regarded as claims.
  10. The Second Circuit has held that a physiological disorder is required to show impairment based upon the regulatory definition in a case involving obesity and not morbid obesity.
  11. The federal decisions are of great help in understanding what constitutes a disability qualifying impairment since there have been so few cases in Texas involving morbid obesity. In a footnote, the Texas Supreme Court noted that there’ve only been three reported morbid obesity cases in the last 30 years in Texas.
  12. Whether obesity is a disorder in the medical community doesn’t say much with respect to whether morbid obesity qualifies as an impairment under the Texas Labor Code.
  13. In a footnote, the Texas Supreme Court says that the ADA is an antidiscrimination statute and not a public health statute. Therefore, Congress’s desires as it relates to the ADA do not necessarily align with those of the medical community.
  14. Reading the regulation as a whole and looking at dictionaries, reveals that a physiological disorder or condition means an abnormal bodily function or state. However, the accumulation of fat cells is a normal bodily process, so asserting that one is overweight is insufficient by itself to show a physiological disorder or condition.
  15. A person’s morbid obesity may be the result of that person’s normal natural response to the person’s lifestyle choices or eating habits. Therefore, a plaintiff would have to show that her body’s process of accumulating fat cells is somehow abnormal, i.e. the result of an underlying physiological disease or condition.
  16. The EEOC interpretive guidance on title I of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at 1630.2(h), here, also support that morbid obesity is not an impairment without an underlying physiological disorder or condition. That guidance states: “the definition of the term “impairment” does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight, or muscle tone that are within “normal” range and (emphasis added by me), are not the result of a physiological disorder. The definition, likewise, does not include characteristic predisposition to illness or disease. Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are also not impairments.”
  17. A natural reading of the interpretive guidance is that weight is an impairment only if it falls outside the normal range and (emphasis in opinion), it occurs as a result of a physiological disorder. Both requirements have to be satisfied. This reading is further supported by the interpretive guidance reference to other conditions not being the result of a physiological disorder, such as pregnancy, not being considered an impairment by the EEOC.
  18. It goes too far to say that any physical characteristic slightly outside the normal range would be a physical impairment in the absence of an underlying physiological cause. Such a reading would be inconsistent with the TCHRA text and purpose and would transform the regarded as claim into a catchall cause of action for discrimination based upon appearance, size, and any number of other things far removed from the reasons why the TCHRA was passed.
  19. The plaintiff does not contend that there is evidence that her morbid obesity resulted from a physiological disorder or that such was the defendant’s perception. In fact, she said as much in her deposition.
  20. The missing pieces are any evidence or inference that plaintiff’s coworkers regarded her obesity as being caused by health issues rather than causing health issues. The distinction matters.

 

II

Justice Blacklock Concurring Opinion

 

  1. Excessive weight is a physical characteristic and not a disability.
  2. Excessive weight may be a symptom of an underlying physiological impairment, in which case it is the underlying physiological impairment and not the weight itself that qualifies as a disability triggering the employment protections of the Texas Labor Code.
  3. Whether obesity is considered an impairment, disability, disorder, condition, or anything else by the medical community in 2023, says nothing about whether obesity qualifies as a disability or impairment under the Texas Labor Code enacted in 1993.
  4. The Labor Code is a legal text and therefore, the meaning of the words in that statute must be the same today as it was in 1993 when the provisions were enacted. Mentioning Justice Scalia, statutory terms mean what they are conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.
  5. There is no shortage of evidence from the time of the statute’s enactment and shortly thereafter, including from federal cases interpreting the same language, that obesity was regarded as a physical characteristic and not a disability in the absence of an underlying physiological disorder.
  6. The Court needs to be wary about adopting federal case law when it comes to interpreting Texas statutes because it is entirely possible that Texans prefer to go in a different way based upon the wording of their own legislation. That is, federal sources of law should not become controlling authority and should only be used as guidance when appropriate.
  7. Extending the Texas Labor Code to the obese would have substantial social and economic consequences. After all, that might render 50% of the population disabled by 2030. On a matter of such vast economic and political significance, the Court should expect the legislature to speak clearly, which is not the case here.

 

III

Justice Boyd Dissenting Opinion

 

  1. Nothing in the Texas Labor Code imposes an underlying physiological disorder or condition requirement or otherwise limits the term disability to physical or mental impairment resulting from any particular cause.
  2. With the amendments to the ADA, Congress amended the ADA to expressly reject the Supreme Court of the United States inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA and to reinstate a broad view of the ADA’s applicability.
  3. With the amendments to the ADA, Congress amended the ADA to expressly require courts to construe the term disability in favor of broad coverage to individuals to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA’s terms.
  4. Congress expressly conveyed its intent that the question of whether an individual’s impairment as a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis. Instead, the focus should be on whether covered entities complied with their ADA obligations.
  5. The Texas Labor Code likewise requires that the term disability be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals and to the maximum extent allowed.
  6. In a regarded as claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant regarded her as having more than a minor impairment that is expected to last less than six months, but she does not have to show that the defendant regarded her as having an impairment that limited the major life activity.
  7. The Texas Labor Code does not define the term impairment. When looking at dictionaries, dictionary to find an impairment as simply a diminishment, deterioration, or loss of function or ability.
  8. Under the plain meaning, and impairment is simply a loss, reduction, or limitation of function or ability. To qualify as a disability, the impairment must be mental or physical and must substantially limit a major life activity. However, nothing about the definition requires that the limitation be caused by an underlying physiological disorder or any other particular cause or source.
  9. Neither the parties nor the majority points to any other statute using the term impairment in a way suggesting anything other than its common, ordinary meaning, much less say that loss or limitation in function qualifies as an impairment only if it results from a particular cause.
  10. When the legislature intended to limit a statutory reference to impairments to those resulting from a particular cause, it consistently and expressly includes that limitation within the statute, such as for workers compensation purposes and for purposes of deciding whether a judge is fit to serve.
  11. In a footnote, Justice Blacklock says that the common ordinary meaning of impairment has not changed since 1993.
  12. No prior decision of the Texas Supreme Court has ever required that this particular statute requires the claimant’s physical loss or limitation to result from any particular cause.
  13. Other sections of the Texas Labor Code indicate that an impairment is simply a condition limiting claimant’s function. Further, two other provisions appear to use the term limitation interchangeably with the term impairment.
  14. The Texas Labor Code expressly compels court to construe the term broadly without imposing any unexpressed requirements.
  15. In a footnote, Justice Blacklock says that the majority concerns about social and economic consequences of a contrary decision are misplaced. In particular, the majority forgets about how a major life activity must be substantially limited. Further, if the legislature makes a policy choice to define the term disability more broadly than wise, a court is not at liberty to veto that choice.
  16. Most people suing for discrimination based upon disability will go with the actual disability prong. Thus, they will have to show a substantial limitation in at least one major life activity. Further, for those opting for the regarded as claim, the plaintiff would have to show that the disability was more than minor. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot rely on the fact that they are obese or morbidly obese. Instead, they have to demonstrate that the obesity is about physical limitations that are substantial or are perceived to be more than just minor.
  17. 21.105 of the Texas Labor Code says that the provision referring to disability discrimination applies only to discrimination because of her on the basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform a job. So, an employer does have the ability to terminate an employee because of impairment if the person cannot reasonably perform her job. Therefore, this particular section actually reduces the number of people who can sue when that disability impairs their performance.
  18. Federal law provides no clear guidance and is conflicting at best with respect to whether a morbid obesity claim requires an underlying physiological impairment.
  19. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h)(1) defines an impairment as a physiological disorder or condition affecting one or more body systems. The Texas Workforce Commission has adopted a rule defining impairment in the same way, though that rule only applies to provisions addressing housing discrimination and fair housing requirements as opposed to employment discrimination. Morbid obesity is undoubtedly such a physiological condition.
  20. The regulations define disability in terms of limiting mental and physical conditions and not in terms of underlying mental or physical processes.
  21. The statute requires an impairment and not just the condition.
  22. The EEOC regulation talking about physical characteristics could easily be read as if the “and,” is actually an, or.”
  23. All the federal courts within the Fifth Circuit (which is Texas), have declined to impose an underlying physiological disorder requirement for weight related disability claims.
  24. The evidence clearly establishes that the University perceived the plaintiff not only being morbidly obese but also being physically impaired as a result of her obesity. In fact, the University doesn’t dispute that, rather they just say that they didn’t perceive an underlying physiological disorder. Whether they perceive an underlying physiological disorder is irrelevant.
  25. While there were certainly numerous concerns with the plaintiff’s performance, the plaintiff only has to show that the impermissible concerns were a motivating factor for the adverse actions even if other factors also motivated those actions. Plenty of direct evidence exists to show that disability was a motivating factor in the termination.

 

IV

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. Texas and Oklahoma are the only two States with a highest court for civil matters and another one for criminal matters.
  2. It will be interesting to see how this opinion affects the courts in the Fifth Circuit when they deal with obesity centered claims.
  3. The federal courts are indeed all over the place with respect to whether morbid obesity requires an underlying physiological or mental condition. For example, we discussed here how the state of Washington has decided that it does not. So, be sure to check your particular federal or state jurisdiction when dealing with obesity claims.
  4. The amendments to the ADA made it such that it shouldn’t be too much of a stretch to find a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity when a person is morbidly obese. That is, you may not even have to allege morbid obesity to find coverage under the ADA actual disability prong where a person is morbidly obese. So, I would not give up easily, if I am on the plaintiff side, in pursuing an actual disability claim when representing a client with morbid obesity.
  5. The reason morbid obesity gets so confusing is that unlike other disabilities the physical or mental impairment isn’t obvious. For example, a deaf ,Deaf, or hard of hearing person clearly has a physical impairment, i.e. hearing loss. They also are substantially limited in the major life activity of communicating with others. Most other disabilities are such that the physical or mental impairment is fairly obvious. Morbid obesity and obesity in general is an exception to that.
  6. Jurisdictions, though it is not necessarily a trend, around the country are enacting laws or ordinances protecting people who are obese from discrimination.
  7. In another life, I litigated over a missing comma. Here, I could foresee litigation over whether the EEOC interpretive guidance “and,” really means “and,” and not, “or.” Of course, it is in an EEOC interpretive guidance and is not necessarily entitled to much deference per Kisor, which we discussed here.
  8. The policy concern that the concurrence has about obesity in Texas is not without justification. For example, the What’s Cooking America website says that Texans are estimated to eat 800,000 orders of chicken fried steak every day. That said, you don’t have to read much to see how obesity is becoming an issue throughout America.
  9. The dissenting opinion does a nice job of laying out the arguments of why morbid obesity should not require an underlying physiological or mental condition.
  10. Interesting perspective from the dissenting opinion talking about the distinction between impairment and conditions. The dissent also talks about the distinction between limiting mental and physical conditions v. underlying mental or physical processes, which is interesting as well.
  11. The advantage to the regarded as prong is that you don’t have to show a substantial limitation on a major life activity. All you have to do is show a physical or mental impairment. On the other hand, the regarded as prong has its disadvantages. First, at least with respect to the ADA, it doesn’t apply to an impairment that is both transitory and minor (the transitory part did not appear in this case). Second, it does not allow for reasonable accommodations.
  12. I am licensed in Texas. That said, the vast majority of my practice is federal based rather than state based. Since I am licensed in Texas, I could do some legal research into what does §21.105 of the Texas labor Code actually mean. That section states: “Sec. 21.105. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON DISABILITY. A provision in this subchapter or Subchapter B referring to discrimination because of disability or on the basis of disability applies only to discrimination because of or on the basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform a job.” The question I have about the statutory section is what does “reasonably perform a job,” mean? That is, it would seem to suggest that it must mean whether a person could perform the job with or without reasonable accommodations. If it does not mean that, then this Texas statute goes way below the ADA in terms of its coverage because the ADA also contains the qualified requirement, i.e. whether the person can do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. If I get a chance, I will do that research. I will be surprised if there is not a reasonable accommodation requirement baked into the statutory provision. It wouldn’t make sense otherwise for there not to be, but you never know.
  13. If question of morbid obesity as a disability goes to the Supreme Court, my guess is that this configuration of the United States Supreme Court would hold that morbid obesity requires an underlying physiological or mental impairment. Again, the workaround to that is it shouldn’t be terribly difficult to find mental or physical impairments that substantially limit a major life activity when a person is morbidly obese besides the morbid obesity.
  14. The concurrence requiring the legislature to speak clearly when huge policy implications are involved reminds me of the United States Supreme Court decision invoking the major question doctrine, which we discussed here.

As everyone knows, I don’t usually blog twice a week. You wouldn’t think I would do that the Friday before the July 4 weekend. However, two Supreme Court decisions came down yesterday. The most notable one that came down yesterday was the decision involving Harvard and the University of North Carolina with respect to race-based admissions practices. As everyone knows, the majority opinion threw out those practices quite emphatically. It was very interesting reading the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas and comparing that to the dissenting opinions of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson. It is Justice Gorsuch’s opinion that may have thrown a grenade into affirmative action generally when he reasons that affirmative action for those receiving federal funds is prohibited by title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Makes me wonder whether affirmative action for federal contractors isn’t dead. It will be interesting to see what the labor and employment lawyers on the management side think of the broader impact of this decision.

 

Two other things happened this week. First, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), went into effect. The EEOC will be issuing regulations before too long one hopes. They did issue a brief question and answer document, here. Second, yesterday the Supreme Court came down with the decision in Groff v. DeJoy, here, where they unanimously threw out the de minimis standard for undue hardship established in Hardison. It is the PWFA and Groff that is the subject of today’s blog. As usual the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: Pregnant Workers Fairness Act; Groff v. Dejoy, which is divided into the categories of: Facts; Hardison in Historical Context; What Did Hardison Actually Say; What Is the Standard Going Forward and Fleshing out That Standard; Justice SotoMayor Concurring Opinion in Which Justice Jackson Joined; and Thoughts/Takeaways for the entire blog entry. The reader is free to concentrate on any or all of the categories throughout this blog entry.

 

I

Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA)

 

  1. PWFA went into effect June 27.
  2. PWFA applies to employers of 15 or more employees.
  3. The EEOC is now taking charges for violations of that act. Any charges for violations of that act would have to stem from an occurrence on June 27 or later. The PWFA does require exhaustion of administrative remedies with the EEOC prior to filing suit.
  4. PWFA protects employees and applicants with known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. It requires reasonable accommodations for person with a limitation related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
  5. A reasonable accommodation is a change to the work environment or the way things are usually done at work.
  6. Requires an interactive process.
  7. A covered employer cannot require an employee to take leave if another reasonable accommodation can be provided that would let the employee keep working.
  8. Has a retaliation and an interference provision.
  9. EEOC will be issuing regulations before too long it is hoped.

 

II

Groff v. DeJoy

 

  1. Facts

 

Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest, not “secular labor” and the “transport[ation]” of 2 GROFF v. DEJOY Opinion of the Court worldly “goods.” App. 294. In 2012, Groff began his employment with the United States Postal Service (USPS), which has more than 600,000 employees. He became a Rural Carrier Associate, a job that required him to assist regular carriers in the delivery of mail. When he took the position, it generally did not involve Sunday work. But within a few years, that changed. In 2013, USPS entered into an agreement with Amazon to begin facilitating Sunday deliveries, and in 2016, USPS signed a memorandum of understanding with the relevant union (the National Rural Letter Carriers’ Association) that set out how Sunday and holiday parcel delivery would be handled. During a 2- month peak season, each post office would use its own staff to deliver packages. At all other times, Sunday and holiday deliveries would be carried out by employees (including Rural Carrier Associates like Groff) working from a “regional hub.” For Quarryville, Pennsylvania, where Groff was originally stationed, the regional hub was the Lancaster Annex.

 

The memorandum specifies the order in which USPS employees are to be called on for Sunday work outside the peak season. First in line are each hub’s “Assistant Rural Carriers”— part-time employees who are assigned to the hub and cover only Sundays and holidays. Second are any volunteers from the geographic area, who are assigned on a rotating basis. And third are all other carriers, who are compelled to do the work on a rotating basis. Groff fell into this third category, and after the memorandum of understanding was adopted, he was told that he would be required to work on Sunday. He then sought and received a transfer to Holtwood, a small rural USPS station that had only seven employees and that, at the time, did not make Sunday deliveries. But in March 2017, Amazon deliveries began there as well.

 

With Groff unwilling to work on Sundays, USPS made other arrangements. During the peak season, Sunday deliveries that would have otherwise been performed by Groff were carried out by the rest of the Holtwood staff, including the postmaster, whose job ordinarily does not involve delivering mail. During other months, Groff ’s Sunday assignments were redistributed to other carriers assigned to the regional hub.1 Throughout this time, Groff continued to receive “progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays. Finally, in January 2019, he resigned. A few months later, Groff sued under Title VII, asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS’s] business.”

 

In two different footnotes, the Supreme Court noted that other employees complained about the plaintiff’s absences, including at least one filed a grievance. Also, plaintiff’s resignation was done, according to the plaintiff (the District Court found a genuine issue of material fact on this question), in light of his expected termination.

 

B

Hardison in Historical Context

 

  1. In 1968, the EEOC issued final regulations obligating employers to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of employees whenever that would not work an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.
  2. In 1972, Congress amended title VII to provide that the term religion includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as beliefs, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.
  3. Hardison arose during the time between the issuance of the EEOC’s undue hardship regulation and the 1972 amendments to title VII.
  4. Hardison is at its core a collective bargaining case and must be read with that in mind. It is not clear that any of the possible accommodations would have actually solved Hardison’s problem without infringing upon seniority rights.

 

C

What Did Hardison Actually Say

 

  1. In the briefs and at oral argument, little space was devoted to the question of determining when increase costs amount to an undue hardship under the statute. Nevertheless, a single sentence in the opinion for the Supreme Court, if taken literally, suggested that even a pittance might be too much for an employer to be forced to endure. In particular, the line said, “to require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”
  2. De minimis took on a world of its own with courts saying it was the standard for religious accommodations.
  3. Hardison referred repeatedly to substantial burdens and that formulation better explains its decision.

 

D

What Is the Standard Going Forward and Fleshing out That Standard

 

  1. Even the Solicitor General disavows its prior position that Hardison should be overruled, but only on the understanding that Hardison does not compel courts to read the more than de minimis standard literally or in a manner undermining Hardison’s references to substantial costs.
  2. More than a de minimis cost does not suffice to establish undue hardship under title VII as Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase.
  3. Undue hardship is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business. This formulation is a fact-specific inquiry comporting with both Hardison and the meaning of undue hardship in ordinary speech.
  4. Turning to the dictionary, a hardship is at a minimum something hard to bear.
  5. Adding the modifier “undue,” means that the requisite burden must rise to an excessive or unjustifiable level.
  6. Even the government agrees that undue hardship must mean something greater than hardship.
  7. Nothing in the history of title VII suggests that undue hardship should be read to mean anything less than its meaning in ordinary use.
  8. No factor discussed by the parties (the ordinary meaning of undue hardship, the EEOC guidelines that Hardison concluded the 1972 amendment ratified, the use of that term by the EEOC prior to those amendments, and the common use of that term in other statutes), supports reducing Hardison to nothing more than a de minimis costs line.
  9. Undue hardship for purposes of religious accommodation occurs where an employer shows that the burden of granting an accommodation results in a substantial increase costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. In figuring that out, courts must apply this formulation in a manner taking into account all relevant factors in the case, including/such as: the particular accommodations at issue; and the practical impact in light of the nature, size and operating costs of an employer.
  10. As for the way forward, plaintiff suggested that the Supreme Court draw upon decades of ADA case law. On the other hand, the government suggested that the Supreme Court say that the EEOC’s construction of Hardison has been basically correct. Both of those suggestions go too far.
  11. No reservation in saying that a good deal of the EEOC’s guidance in the area of religious accommodation is sensible and will in all likelihood be unaffected by the decision. So, this decision may prompt little if any change in the agency’s guidance explaining why no undue hardship is imposed by temporary costs, voluntary shift swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs. That said, it is imprudent to ratify the body of the EEOC’s interpretation when there has not been the benefit of the clarification of undue hardship from this opinion.
  12. Undue hardship in title VII means exactly what it says, and it should be up to the courts to resolve whether hardship would be substantial in the context of an employer’s business in the common sense manner used in implying the test formulated here.
  13. Title VII requires an assessment of a possible accommodation’s effect on the conduct of the employer’s business.
  14. It is not a question of whether all impacts and coworkers are relevant, rather it is the coworker impacts that go on to affect the conduct of the business. A court has to look at the effect on the conduct of the business.
  15. A coworker’s dislike of religious practice and expression in the workplace or the mere fact of an accommodation is not something that can be factored into the undue hardship inquiry. That is, an employer failing to provide an accommodation has a defense only if the hardship is “undue,” and a hardship attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered, “undue.” To hold otherwise, would set title VII at war with itself.
  16. Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s practice of religion, and not merely that it assessed the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommodations.
  17. It will be up to the lower courts to come up with the context specific applications of the standard set forth in this opinion.

 

 

III

Concurring Opinion of JusticeSotoMayor in Which Justice Jackson Joined

 

  1. Justice SotoMayor and Justice Jackson wrote a concurrence saying that the approach taken by the majority opinion of clarifying Hardison rather than overruling it was absolutely correct.
  2. Title VII requires undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. Since conduct of the business plainly include the management and performance of the business’s employees, undue hardship on the conduct of a business may include undue hardship on the business’s employees.
  3. As the majority opinion mentioned, animus toward a protected group is not a cognizable hardship under any antidiscrimination statute.
  4. Some hardships, such as the labor costs of court nearing voluntary shift wipes, are not undue because they are too insubstantial.

 

 

IV

Thoughts/Takeaways for the Entire Blog Entry

 

  1. It is going to be very interesting to see whether the EEOC final implementing regulation for the PWFA with respect to undue hardship, track the ADA final implementing regulations in some way or whether they will track the Supreme Court decision in Groff v. DeJoy.
  2. I see it all the time on the ADA side where leave is forced on an employee instead of exploring a reasonable accommodation. The PWFA is yet another reason why this is not a good idea on either the ADA or the PWFA side.
  3. The EEOC final regulations implementing the PWFA are going to be a critical factor in understanding just what undue hardship means. Keep in mind that those regulation will go through the Administrative Procedure Act process. So, it may be some time before a definite answer exists. In the meantime, we might see enforcement guidances and the like.
  4. Employers will definitely have to reconfigure how they have been dealing with religious accommodations as de minimis is no longer the standard.
  5. In many ways, the Supreme Court opinion closely approaches but does not necessarily get there, the ADA concept of fundamental alteration on the operation of the business.
  6. Similarly, the Supreme Court opinion closely approaches but does not necessarily get there, the ADA concept of undue hardship in the financial sense, which looks to the entire resources of the financial entity.
  7. The ADA concept of fundamental alteration while a higher level than undue hardship under title VII, may be an excellent preventive law tool for employers to use with respect to granting religious accommodations.
  8. Undue burden is fact specific. Whenever you see wording like that, it is music to plaintiff attorneys ears and not something that would make defense attorneys very happy.
  9. When the Court suggested all relevant factors include: 1) the particular accommodations at issue; and 2) the practical impact in light of the nature, size, and operating costs of an employer, the Court was not clear whether these are the only two factors to consider or whether these two factors are part of a nonexclusive list. We will have to stay tuned for further developments.