We have discussed previously whether disability related conduct is something that an employer can terminate for. The answer is complicated and it can turn on very fine distinctions. See here and here for example. The answer may also depend on the particular State a person is in. This week’s blog entry discusses a Supreme Court decision from Iowa decided on April 24, 2026, Hunter v. City of Des Moines, here.

The unanimous decision remands for a new trial the disability discrimination claims  and throws out the failure to accommodate claim. The decision concerns Iowa law, but federal law was extremely persuasive. As usual, blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; why plaintiff was a qualified person; why plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his disability was a motivating factor in the City’s; termination of his employment; why the appellate court directed verdict in favor of the City on plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim was the correct decision; why the jury instruction was both fatally flawed and correct; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

I

Facts

Plaintiff, is a highly regarded police officer who suffered a mental health crisis after his best friend on the police force died by suicide. One night plaintiff drank excessively at a wedding celebration in another town, got into his vehicle to drive home, and then was arrested and had a series of confrontations with law enforcement. During those confrontations, plaintiff repeatedly invoked his status as a police officer and threatened to do physical harm or ruin the careers of those he engaged with. Plaintiff also at times used misogynistic and homophobic language.

Plaintiff was immediately remorseful for his misconduct and sought psychological help, which led to a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to the colleague’s suicide. But in the meantime, a disciplinary process went forward, and the police chief terminated plaintiff’s employment the day after he disclosed his PTSD diagnosis. Plaintiff then filed suit under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), alleging discrimination on the basis of his PTSD disability (disparate treatment and failure to accommodate).

At trial, the jury returned a verdict holding the City liable on both claims and awarding plaintiff over $2.6 million in back pay, front pay, and emotional distress damages. It also awarded plaintiff over $426,000 in attorney fees. The City appealed to the appellate court, and in a 3-2 decision, held that there was sufficient evidence in the record that plaintiff was qualified for the job as a police sergeant and that his PTSD with a motivating factor in his termination. However, the majority also found that a new trial was required on the disability discrimination claim by the jury instruction focusing on stereotypes, which negated an intentionality requirement for disparate treatment claim and undermine the well-established motivating factor standard. The majority of the appellate court panel also held that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim because the reasonable accommodation request came too late, i.e. post misconduct. Both parties appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.

II

Why Plaintiff Was a Qualified Person

1. The Iowa Civil Rights Act makes it an unfair or discriminatory practice to discharge an employee because of their disability. The Iowa law only has a general proscription against discrimination, and so Iowa courts have looked to corresponding federal statutes for the framework to analyze claims and apply the statute.
2. Iowa uses a McDonnell Douglas approach when it comes to disability discrimination claims. That is, a plaintiff must initially prove a prima facie case by showing: 1) they have a disability; 2) they are qualified to perform the essential functions of the position; and 3) circumstances of the termination raise an inference of illegal discrimination. Once that prima facie case is established, the burden shifts back to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. After that, the employee must show that the disability was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take an adverse action against the employee.
3. The parties agree that plaintiff has a disability. As such, the City could prevail if it proves it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s disability into account.
4. Since the City presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, plaintiff is required to show his disability was at least a motivating factor in his termination.
5. In Iowa, a person is qualified if they can perform the essential functions of the position in question with or without reasonable accommodation without endangering the health and safety of himself or others.
6. A diagnosis of PTSD does not necessarily render a law enforcement official unqualified to do their job. That determination is a question of fact and is not solely based upon the diagnosis.
7. For approximately six months after the suicide, plaintiff continued to successfully perform the functions while privately coping with mental health struggles. On the one occasion he experienced PTSD symptoms while at work, he managed his emotions by collecting himself in another room. The City’s own psychologist concluded the plaintiff was fit for duty in October 2020. Even more importantly, the Chief of Police agreed that plaintiff was capable of performing the function of a Sgt. when he was promoted less than a month before the misconduct occurred.
8. Plaintiff introduced a good deal of evidence that losing his job aggravated his PTSD as it eliminated his support system within the police force. Even so, plaintiff testified at trial that with the ongoing counseling he had been receiving, he was able to fulfill the duties of the police officer.
9. Evidence existed that plaintiff could have been reassigned per the Iowa Administrative Code (which requires an employer to make every reasonable effort to continue the individual in the same position or to retain and reassign the employee and to assist that individual’s rehabilitation), to other job responsibilities. The Chief of Police testified that there were sergeant positions within the administrative services division that plaintiff could have been transferred to. The jury instruction on this issue was perfectly appropriate (a person has to be able to do the essential functions of their police officer’s job with or without reasonable accommodations and that such accommodation could include rotating employee job duties or roles).

III

Why Sufficient Evidence Existed That Plaintiff’s Disability was a Motivating Factor in the Termination

1. A motivating factor exists in an adverse action if the employee’s status as a member of a protected class played a part in the employer’s decision.
2. The discriminatory motive does not need to be the only reason for the defendant’s actions.
3. Plaintiff’s termination came one day after he disclosed his PTSD diagnosis to his employer. Plaintiff also presented evidence of a stigma associated with mental health issues within the police department.
4. Plaintiff introduced a good deal of comparator evidence (the court noted that the comparators all involve the same decision maker, the Chief of Police, and a jury could have seen the other conduct as misconduct of equal seriousness. The City also had the opportunity to rebut those comparators with evidence), and effectively cross-examined the Chief of Police with that evidence. From that evidence, a jury could conclude that the police department had a high tolerance threshold for off-duty, alcohol fueled misbehavior.
5. Chief of Police did not deliberate for days on the decision to terminate the plaintiff as he promised he would. Instead he fired him the next day. So, a jury could think the Chief of Police having become aware of plaintiff’s PTSD, wanted to avoid a drawn out decision that might have brought PTSD concerns even more than the surface.

IV

Why The Appellate Court Directed Verdict In Favor of The City On Plaintiff’s Failure To Accommodate Claim Was the Correct Decision

1. Seeking accommodation after engaging in terminable misconduct is too late.
2. An employee engaging in terminable conduct cannot avoid the consequences of his actions by then requesting an accommodation for those actions.

V

Why The Jury Instruction Was Both Fatally Flawed And Correct

1. Disability discrimination laws acknowledge the effects of society’s stereotypes on employers in their decision-making, and that biased decision-making based on those stereotypes can violate the law even where the decision-makers are unaware of their bias in their thinking. That makes sense because the law’s purpose is to eradicate discrimination in all forms regardless of the personal character of the individuals making discriminatory decisions.
2. The jury instruction stated: “If you find from all the surrounding circumstances that Defendant treated Matthew Hunter differently than they would have if he had not had a disability or if he had not requested a reasonable accommodation—even if the managers do not acknowledge or realize their own motives—you may find in favor of Mr. Hunter.”
3. Since plaintiff had to prove that he suffered intentional discrimination because of his disability, an employer who is unaware of their bias normally can’t be engaging in intentional discrimination.
4. The law demands that plaintiff was discharged because of his disability as opposed to the misconduct caused by the disability. Plaintiff also had to show that he was still qualified to perform the essential functions of his position.
5. The instruction’s discussion of stereotypes created more confusion rather than clarity. For example, the instruction told the jury that biased decision-making based upon stereotypes can violate the law. However, it didn’t explain how it would violate the law.
6. Certainly, the City could be subject to liability if the Chief of Police fired the plaintiff because the Chief of Police held a stereotypical view that police officers with PTSD couldn’t do their job if in fact plaintiff could do the job. However, those qualifiers were omitted emitted from the instruction, which omission was exploited by plaintiff’s counsel during closing arguments.
7. Believing that someone with PTSD is unfit to be a cop (“cop,” is used in the opinion), is not illegal unless all the elements of a disability discrimination claim are proven.
8. Prejudice occurs and reversal is required if jury instructions have misled the jury, or if the trial court materially misstates the law. Both are true in this case.
9. The same decision defense jury instruction was permissible. That jury instruction talks about the City having a valid defense if it proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the protected characteristic into account.
10. Though an employer is prohibited from discharging the employee based on a disability, an employer is not prohibited from discharging the employee based on misconduct even if that misconduct is related to a disability.
11. Terminating somebody for conduct caused by a disability is not the same thing as firing them because of the disability.
12. An employer can terminate an employee for misconduct, so long as the employee’s disability was not a motivating factor or, if it was, the employer demonstrated that it would’ve made the same decision without taking the disability into account.
13. The Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting the City’s comparator instruction as that instruction was too restrictive. Requiring comparators to have engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances is simply unattainable and unrealistic.

VI

Thoughts/Takeaways

1. There is a raging debate in the courts over whether McDonnell Douglas is going to survive for long. Already, a couple of Supreme Court justices have said that it shouldn’t, particularly with respect to deciding summary judgment motions. See this blog entry. There are also cases saying that the McDonnell Douglas approach does not apply at trial, but in Iowa it apparently does. I am not licensed in Iowa, so I don’t know if that is actually the case.
2. Terminating someone for misconduct is perfectly appropriate, but figuring the disability into that decision is not. Admittedly, the lines can get blurred in certain circumstances.
3. Diagnosis does not make a person with a disability unqualified for their job. Question is assuming they have a disability, can they do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations.
4. In failure to accommodate cases, you do not see the use of comparators because you are focusing on an individualized analysis. However, when you were talking about whether it was the disability that played a role in the termination decision v. the misconduct, it makes perfect sense that comparators would come into play.
5. Reassignment to another position is a reasonable accommodation as a matter of last resort. See this blog entry.
6. A motivating factor is not the same thing as sole cause. See this blog entry.
7. Seeking an accommodation for disability after engaging interminable misconduct is too late.
8. The ADA does prohibit using stereotypes as a basis for adverse actions. After all, one of the prongs of what is a disability is whether a person is regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.
9. In disparate treatment cases, you have to have intentional discrimination. You get to a different answer with respect to failure to accommodate.
10. While Iowa apparently uses an endangering health and safety of self or others standard, direct threat under the ADA is a completely different kettle of fish and a much higher standard than health and safety (I am not an Iowa license attorney, so I don’t know if the court meant to be referring to the ADA direct threat standard using incorrect language, or if Iowa actually follows a health and safety standard). We have discussed direct threat numerous times in this blog, such as here for example.