When the Federal Bar Association national convention was held in Kansas City Missouri, I was part of a panel that explored outside the box uses of the ADA. One of the panelist, Jamie Strawbridge, talked about how the ADA/504 can be an alterative to excessive force §1983 cases. The case of the week explores exactly that.

 

The case of the day is the estate of Ryan Leroux v. Montgomery County, here, decided on October 24, 2025, in the United States District Court for Maryland, Southern Division. This is an excessive force case which was pursued as an ADA/504 claim instead of as a §1983 claim. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories (lots of them), and they are: facts; a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff had a mental impairment as defined by the ADA; a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited major life activities; a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County knew of plaintiff’s disability and the need for accommodation; a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County failed to provide reasonable accommodations; exigent circumstances is not a get out of jail free card in this case; defendants have not conclusively established the affirmative defense of direct threat; a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County’s failure to reasonably accommodate proximately caused plaintiff’s death, and therefore  the claims survive plaintiff’s death; a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County discriminated against plaintiff based on his disability; a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County acted with deliberate indifference; a reasonable jury could find that a Montgomery County official knew of the need to accommodate plaintiff and failed to act; reasonable jury could find that an officer of Montgomery County did not provide plaintiff with an accommodation and was an official with authority to correct the discrimination against the plaintiff; a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County was deliberately indifferent in failing to train officers on federal disability law; a reasonable jury could find that the defendant officers are not entitled to public official immunity and genuine issues of material fact exists; and thoughts/takeaways.

 

I

Facts

 

For purposes of this blog entry, the term “plaintiff,” either refers to the person who was killed or to what his attorneys did in proving up the case.

 

The specific facts are in the opinion and they are quite extensive. I will try to condense it considerably in this section of the blog entry, especially given all the categories needing to be covered in this blog entry. Other facts might come up and be mentioned in the various categories of this blog entry.

 

Basically, you have a person with a documented history of mental illness, including paranoia, that was well-known to the Montgomery County police. The person (plaintiff), pulls into a drive-through at McDonald’s, orders his food, receives his food, but does not pay. When challenged about that, he tried to convince McDonald’s that he had paid for the food. That led to a 911 call where the situation was discussed and then put on the list of pending nonpriority calls for service. Another officer happened by and checked on the situation with the McDonald’s employee. McDonald’s employee said that the plaintiff was just sitting there and not saying much, though he was still blocking the drive-through lane. At 10:28 PM, Ofc. Brooks Inman arrived and when he checked on the situation he noticed that there was a handgun in the seat next to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was unresponsive to any of the commands issued by the officer. The officer then backed up keeping his firearm drawn and called for backup. Eventually a total of 17 officers were present at the McDonald’s. They surrounded plaintiff’s car at a distance of about 10 yards, drew their handguns, and one even trained an assault rifle on the plaintiff. What follows subsequently was disorganization by the officers with no plan at all. Eventually, a crisis negotiator radioed that he was two minutes away. A few seconds later, plaintiff again raised the gun with his right arm and several officers opened fire by firing a total of 23 shots at the plaintiff where he died after being transported to a hospital. Again, the facts are extremely extensive and go into far more detail than what is described here, and the reader is referred to the actual opinion for that. I tried to keep the facts to the critical points in the interest of space.

 

Plaintiff’s estate sues under §504, Title II of the ADA, and Maryland state law and NOT §1983. As typical, the defendants moved for summary judgment after discovery. The court wasn’t having it.

 

II

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Plaintiff Had a Mental Impairment as Defined by The ADA

 

  1. When assessing claims filed under the ADA, the definition of disability gets construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage. Such an approach is consistent with the amendments to the ADA whose purpose was to make it easier for people with disability to obtain protection under the ADA by focusing on whether entities complied with their obligations and whether discrimination occurred rather than on definitional matters.
  2. Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to show that he suffered from a mental impairment as defined by the ADA. Such evidence includes: 1) being involuntarily committed for inpatient treatment with the diagnosis of unspecified mental health disorder; 2) treating physicians checking a box saying that he had a mental disorder; 3) being discharged with a diagnosis of psychosis; 4) being prescribed antipsychotic medication; 4) plaintiff expert stating that he most likely has schizophrenia; and 5) the way he reacted during the fatal police encounter by remaining uncommunicative and unresponsive for a period of over two hours was also typical of someone with a mental illness.
  3. The Fourth Circuit has declined to require that medical evidence is necessary to always establish a disability at the summary judgment stage, even where an alleged impairment might be unfamiliar to a lay jury.
  4. Nothing in Title II of the ADA requires a person to be formally diagnosed with a mental health disorder before finding the person has a mental impairment.
  5. The fact that a non-examining expert declined to formally diagnose an impairment based on the record alone does not support a finding of no disability.
  6. The argument that a diagnosis of psychosis is not a mental impairment runs counter to federal guidance that the definition of disability must be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permissible under the ADA.
  7. Plaintiff produced an expert opinion indicating that the prolonged paranoia of the plaintiff as he experienced it after October 2020 is more consistent with a mental health disability rather than a one time consumption of any drugs. Further, there is no evidence that drug use played a role in the instances plaintiff put forward with respect a previous incident at a hotel and what happened at McDonald’s.

 

III

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Plaintiff’s Impairment Substantially Limited Major Life Activities

 

  1. In considering whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a major life activity, the statutory text must be broadly construed in favor of expansive coverage. It is not a demanding standard to meet.
  2. Plaintiff’s estate put forward evidence that when plaintiff was experiencing the effects of his mental health disability, it impacted his ability to think, communicate, interact with others, and speak.
  3. Without his medication, he said he dreamt about people trying to kill him.
  4. It is not normal to act unresponsive to the police.

 

IV

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Montgomery County Knew of Plaintiff’s Disability And The Need For Accommodation

 

  1. Title II of the ADA applies to police activities and investigations.
  2. Under Title II of the ADA, a public entity must make reasonable modifications when the entity had knowledge of a person’s disability related limitations.
  3. A person’s need for accommodation must be clear.
  4. A plaintiff may establish that a defendant knew of an individual’s need for accommodation by showing that the individual with a disability or a third party lucidly asked for a modification, but a specific request is not required.
  5. A plaintiff can also demonstrate knowledge by showing that an individual’s disability and resulting need for an accommodation were obvious or apparent.
  6. Evidence indicating that a person’s disability and need for an accommodation were obvious includes evidence that officers on the scene: 1) observed behavior suggesting that an individual suffered from a disability; 2) received training on behavior indicators associated with particular disability; or 3) received information from third parties suggesting the presence of the disability.
  7. The court was not buying the argument of Montgomery County that officials were never told that plaintiff had a disability and plaintiff never requested an accommodation because neither action is necessary in order to establish knowledge under the ADA. Instead, to establish that Montgomery County had an obligation to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA, all plaintiff had to show was that his disability related limitations and subsequent need for an accommodation were obvious.
  8. Plaintiff produced evidence that County officials knew of his disability early. Specifically, a McDonald’s employee told the dispatcher that plaintiff was acting crazy. That employee also elaborated by describing abnormal behavior, i.e. refusing to exit the drive through line, stopping communicating or responding, and putting on his headphones as well as making statements that were simply not true to the McDonald’s employee.
  9. Plaintiff’s expert on emergency response communications stated that based on the call, the call taker knew or should have known that the call for service involved a mental health component and required a modified response.
  10. Plaintiff’s experts reported that symptoms of plaintiff’s mental illness were readily observable and obvious once officers arrived on the scene. The expert testified that plaintiff presented as mentally disorganized, with flat affect, and engaged in abnormal behavior. The expert also testified that his behavior included symptoms of catatonia, such as not moving, not talking, staring, or sluggish responses, all of which were observed by the officers on the scene. The observable nature of plaintiff’s symptoms not only supports an inference that County officials knew of plaintiff’s disability, but also to knowledge of the limitations caused by that disability and the need for an accommodation to address those limitations.
  11. While at the scene, officers observed plaintiff’s inability to engage, answer questions, or follow basic commands. One officer even noted the abnormality of the behavior by saying that he had no idea what was going on with the guy, and it was like a suicide by cop type of thing. Another officer expressed similar sentiments. Several of the officers testified they knew there was something wrong and that this was not a normal situation. Further, after only two minutes on the scene, the commanding officer requested a dispatch of crisis negotiators.
  12. Plaintiff’s also produced evidence that Montgomery County officers are trained on recognizing and interacting with people with mental illness. That training included information on recognizing potential symptoms of people in emotional distress, mental distress, and instructed officers that when a person with a mental illness does not comply with orders, it is entirely possible they are not intentionally ignoring orders or being defiant. The training also noted that many people with mental health disorders experience processing delays and/or may be distracted by hallucinations or other stimuli.
  13. Montgomery County was familiar with plaintiff through past interaction. Prior encounters with the police predicated on the same individual’s suspected mental illness can imply knowledge, even if it involves separate officers in the same department.
  14. The fact that abnormal behavior could indicate either a mental illness or indicate substance use is not enough to allow an entity to be free and clear of knowledge of a disability under the ADA.
  15. Officers at the scene were not operating under the assumption that plaintiff’s abnormal behavior was due to substance use.
  16. All an individual has to do is demonstrate obvious limitations and a clear need for accommodation. Where the circumstances indicate that an individual has an obvious need for accommodation, the ADA shifts the burden of compliance on to public bodies and their employees.
  17. In a footnote, the court noted that in the Fourth Circuit satisfying the knowledge requirement means a plaintiff has to show: 1) the physical or mental disability related limitation is known; and 2) the need for accommodation is clear. That is, it is the need for the accommodation and not the specific necessary accommodation itself that must be obvious. Many other circuits agree with this principle.

 

V

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Montgomery County Failed to Provide Reasonable Accommodations

 

  1. A modification is reasonable if it is reasonable on its face or ordinarily in the run of cases and does not cause an undue hardship.
  2. What constitutes a reasonable accommodation during a police investigation is a question of fact and varies according to the circumstances.
  3. Exigent circumstances are considered as part of the reasonableness of the accommodation rather than as a separate inquiry. The existence of such circumstances does not excuse officers from providing reasonable accommodations.
  4. When the County first became aware of plaintiff’s abnormal behavior, the McDonald’s employee stated that the plaintiff was not a danger to those around him. At that point, plaintiff’s expert stated that Montgomery County knew or should have known that plaintiff was exhibiting disability related limitations and required an accommodation, thereby triggering the County’s obligation to accommodate under the ADA. So, given the content of the call and the opinions of the experts, a reasonable jury could find that Montgomery County had a responsibility to provide a reasonable accommodation at the 911 call stage but failed to do so.
  5. A reasonable jury could find that the accommodations provided were ineffective or unreasonably delayed and therefore, inadequate under the ADA. For example, the presence of trained officers in mental health awareness was not provided until 75 minutes after the initial 911 call. Once those officers were on the scene, they did not adhere to their training thereby providing accommodation in name only.
  6. Nearly all of the mental health trained officers who were asked about their training could not answer any questions about the content of the training.
  7. Asking for crisis negotiators was arguably just too late as the crisis negotiators were not asked for until 97 minutes after the 911 call and 21 minutes after the first officer arrived on the scene.
  8. Unreasonable delay may constitute a denial of an accommodation. While relatively short delays do not support such an argument, the circumstances surrounding a delay are part of a larger reasonableness inquiry and have to be considered within the context of an individual incident.
  9. A delay is more likely to be reasonable when an entity is actively working towards securing an accommodation or when an entity has no reason to believe harm may follow from a brief delay.
  10. If a genuine factual dispute exists surrounding such a delay, that question is one for the factfinder to figure out.
  11. Prior to the event or a request for a crisis intervention team, no officer attempted to secure such an accommodation, and the scene was tactical chaos with 17 officers without any clearly assigned roles and without any coordinated response plan or any form of organization of the scene.
  12. County officials had good reason to believe that harm may come to the plaintiff if the situation continued.
  13. Plaintiff produced evidence that the County’s failure to call for negotiators and implement mental health accommodation sooner was counter to Montgomery County’s own policies and training.

 

VI

Exigent Circumstances Is Not A Get Out Of Jail Free Card In This Case

 

  1. The behavior of officers at the scene undercuts any argument that exigent circumstances were involved. In particular: 1) in the 34 minutes between when the first officer on the scene arrived and plaintiff’s death, groups of officers milled around making small talk or joking around; 2) the commanding officer on the scene walked around the scene for 10 minutes without any sense of urgency and almost never giving any proactive instruction to anyone; 3) throughout this period, plaintiff was calm and had made no threats or shown any signs of violence or escalation; 4) a Sgt. described the scene as secure, noting that innocent were out of the way and the McDonald’s was sealed off; and 5) plaintiff’s expert in police training in crisis intervention stated that based on plaintiff’s behavior, the environment, and the context of the situation, the gun in the seat next to plaintiff did not pose an immediate threat for much of the time.
  2. When plaintiff pointed the gun at officers, that event occurred well after the officers obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation arose, which was over 90 minutes after the 911 call and 18 minutes after officers arrived on the scene.
  3. Plaintiff’s action did not impact the officer’s ability to summon mental health resources before he raised the weapon.
  4. 17 officers were on the scene, most without any clearly assigned roles.
  5. What constitutes a reasonable accommodation is a question of fact.

 

VII

Defendants Have Not Conclusively Established The Affirmative Defense Of Direct Threat

 

  1. In order to determine whether an individual poses a direct threat per 28 C.F.R. §35.139, a public entity must make an individualized assessment, based on a reasonable judgment relying on current medical knowledge are on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.
  2. When summary judgment is sought on an affirmative defense, the movant must conclusively establish all essential elements of that defense.
  3. Defendant must conclusively show that Montgomery County conducted an individualized inquiry to ascertain the nature of the risk, the probability that potential injury will occur, and whether modifications would mitigate that risk.
  4. Plaintiff produced plenty of evidence that the County did not utilize resources available-either the County’s mental health resources or the resources available to officers by way of their laptops in their cruisers-in order to learn more about the plaintiff, past police involvement, or his mental health history, all of which could have been easily found if they had done so.
  5. More than one officer stated that they did not consider calling any mental health resources to the scene.
  6. Defendants simply have not conclusively shown that plaintiff posed a direct threat that could not be eliminated through reasonable modifications, nor that the County made an individualized assessment based on the best available objective evidence.

 

VIII

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Montgomery County’s Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Proximately Caused Plaintiff’s Death, and therefore the claim survived the plaintiff’s death.

 

  1. In the Fourth Circuit as well as in other circuits, courts have tended to hold that federal common law rather than state law, governs the survival of claims for compensatory damages under the ADA.
  2. Remedial actions survive the death of a plaintiff.
  3. An action for compensatory damages under the ADA is remedial and not punitive in nature.
  4. Plaintiff produced evidence demonstrating that had plaintiff’s disability been accommodated in a reasonably timely manner, the incident at McDonald’s would not have resulted in plaintiff’s death.

 

IX

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Montgomery County Discriminated Against Plaintiff Based On His Disability

 

  1. Failure to provide accommodations may constitute a form of disability discrimination.
  2. Failure to accommodate claims focus on whether a defendant failed to respond reasonably to the individual’s disability and therefore harms the victim.
  3. In the context of a failure to accommodate claim how plaintiff’s own behavior impacts the reasonableness of an accommodation is considered within the greater totality of the circumstances involved.

 

X

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Montgomery County Acted with Deliberate Indifference

 

  1. Citing to cases we have previously discussed in our blog, here and here, the court noted that a plaintiff may demonstrate discriminatory intent through a showing of deliberate indifference. A position most of the circuits have taken as well.
  2. For a plaintiff to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show in the Fourth Circuit: 1) an ongoing or likely violation of a federally protected rights; 2) knowledge of a substantial risk of deprivation of those rights; and 3) a failure to act to resolve that risk.
  3. Deliberate indifference is an actual notice standard and requires a deliberate or conscious choice to ignore something. In other words, an official have to know of the dangers to federal rights and none of the less disregard them. That official must know of the facts from which a federal rights violation could be inferred and then actually draw the inference from that.

 

XI

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That A Montgomery County Official Knew Of The Need To Accommodate Plaintiff And Failed To Act

 

  1. When a risk is so obvious that an official must have had knowledge, that is sufficient to get a deliberate indifference question to a jury.
  2. Obvious goes beyond what a reasonably prudent person would know, but rather looks to whether a risk was so obvious they must have known.
  3. Liability can be imputed to a county only when a county official with authority to address the discrimination knew of the likely federal rights violation but failed to act.

 

XII

Reasonable Jury Could Find That An Officer Of Montgomery County Did Not Provide Plaintiff With An Accommodation And Was An Official With Authority To Correct The Discrimination Against The Plaintiff

 

  1. The strongest argument for deliberate indifference is against defendant Ofc. Inman.
  2. Inman was one of those people with mental health awareness training and must have been exposed to indicators of mental illness. What the officer encountered at the scene should have been put him on notice that he was dealing with a person with significant mental health issues and would have to adjust his behavior accordingly. In fact, he repeatedly remarked to others about plaintiff’s behavior.
  3. Inman directly observed and commented on the obvious impact of plaintiff’s disability, including his abnormal behavior, inappropriate response to police present, and plaintiff’s inability to effectively communicate or respond to police commands.
  4. Rather than implement de-escalation tactics, officer Inman engaged in escalatory behavior by holding the plaintiff at gunpoint, screaming at him, and suggesting that other officers, “Pepper spray his ass.”
  5. Inman did not take any affirmative steps to implement any plan or accommodations and in fact asked people multiple times what was the plan and what did everybody else wants to do. Accordingly, the officer did not make good faith effort to remedy plaintiff’s problems either by applying his training, implementing de-escalation tactics, or calling for mental health supports.
  6. An official for the purpose of imposing liability on an entity like Montgomery County, is a person who has some discretion at a key decision point in the administrative process.
  7. Plaintiff produced evidence that Ofc. Inman had both the discretion at key decision points and the authority to implement accommodations on the night plaintiff was killed. He was empowered to call for crisis negotiators or implement other accommodations. He also had mental health awareness training and was the primary officer tasked with determining if other mental health resources were needed.

 

XIII

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Montgomery County Was Deliberately Indifferent in Failing To Train Officers On Federal Disability Law

 

  1. Plaintiff put forward evidence indicating that Montgomery County failed to uniformly train their police officers on disability law.
  2. Multiple officers testified in the deposition that they either did not receive training on disability law or they did not remember the training.
  3. While Ofc. Inman did receive ADA training, he did not receive it until he had been with the Montgomery County Police Department for over nine years.
  4. While the training included several sessions on identifying and interacting with individuals with mental health disabilities, it provided no information on disability law or on an officer’s statutory duty to provide reasonable accommodations.
  5. A jury could reasonably find that Montgomery County’s failure to uniformly or comprehensively train officers on their obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act present an obvious potential for violations of federal rights.
  6. Without specific training on disability law, there is no reason to assume that an officer knows how to comply with the sensitive and nuanced obligations imposed upon him by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
  7. Training on mental illness generally is not a substitute for training on the sensitive and nuanced obligations that police officers under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
  8. Insufficient evidence exists that the mental illness trainings informed officers of their statutory obligations to provide individuals with mental health disabilities with reasonable accommodations when necessary.

 

XIV

A Reasonable Jury Could Find That The Defendant Officers Are Not Entitled To Public Official Immunity And Genuine Issues Of Material Fact Exists

 

  1. Maryland law provides that an official of a municipal Corporation when acting in a discretionary capacity without malice and within the scope of their employment or authority, is immune as an official or individual from any civil liability for the performance of the action. However, no such immunity exists for intentional torts, acts committed with actual malice, or acts that are grossly negligent.
  2. Gross negligence is defined as an intentional failure to perform a clear duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the making of any effort to avoid them.
  3. The question of whether an officer acted with gross negligence or malice is generally a question for the jury.
  4. Plaintiff need not show malice or gross negligence as to the use of force, but rather as to their conduct across the police response as a whole.
  5. A reasonable jury could find that the officers were grossly negligent by failing to implement de-escalation tactics and failing to attempt to secure mental health resources for the plaintiff despite the readily observable nature of his disability and his related limitations.
  6. All of the officers received mental health awareness training where they should have been able to recognize that mental health issues were involved. That training also encouraged officers facing this kind of situation to consider reaching out to the crisis center in order to see if they have any history with the individual that would be useful in diffusing the current crisis. The training also talked about how interaction with people with significant mental health issues can be entirely different than interaction with those without such issues. Finally, Montgomery County’s own expert stated that it would be appropriate to have a crisis negotiator involved in the scene when the initial levels and initial efforts of communication from the responding officers to an individual in an agitated state or in a moment of crisis had proven unsuccessful.

 

XV

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. This case is an excellent example of how a plaintiff attorney might forgo entirely §1983 in favor of ADA Title II claims and §504 claims. One advantage to doing it that way, is to circumvent qualified immunity arguments. The two disadvantages are: 1) that it is very much an unknown as to what kind of damages might be available; and 2) causation is different between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
  2. While the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA get interpreted in the same way, causation is not the same with the ADA being “by reason of,” and the Rehabilitation Act being “solely by reason.” The distinction as we discussed here, matters.
  3. Medical evidence is not always necessary to establish a disability at the summary judgment stage even where the particular impairment at issue might be unfamiliar to a lay jury.
  4. A formal diagnosis is not necessary in order for a person to have a disability under the ADA.
  5. Title II of the ADA applies to police activities and investigations. See also this blog entry.
  6. A plaintiff doesn’t have to make clear that they have a disability or request an accommodation if the disability related limitations and subsequent need for an accommodation are obvious.
  7. I have noticed in my practice that police officers are routinely trained on mental health awareness but are lacking in training with respect to their obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. It has been particularly noticeable in the area of service animals (full disclosure: training on what the ADA does and does not require is a huge part of my practice), but it also impacts excessive force training as well.
  8. I previously discussed in this blog entry how the training on excessive force is using a case that would in all probability violates               the ADA. This is a case that illustrates how police department need to think beyond the traditional excessive force situations, and expand their thinking to how to deal with persons with disabilities in terms of the obligations they have under the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
  9. Exigent circumstances are not a get out of jail free card for police departments. You have to look at the overall circumstances involved.
  10. Unreasonable delay in granting an accommodation is actionable.
  11. I still have no idea what it means that a modification is reasonable if it is reasonable on its face or ordinarily in the run of cases.
  12. Direct threat is an affirmative defense and all of its elements must be conclusively shown by the party setting forth the defense.
  13. It is going to be very interesting to see how the court deals with damages going forward. This decision says deliberate indifference has been shown or certainly arguably has been shown. However, that doesn’t answer the question because the question is still what kind of compensatory damages can the plaintiff receive. We know on the Rehabilitation Act side that emotional distress damages are out per Cummings, here. We also know that many courts are saying that emotional distress damages are also out with respect to Title II cases. It is an open question to eventually be decided by the Supreme Court whether Title II of the ADA prohibits emotional distress damages because it is not spending clause litigation unlike the Rehabilitation Act. The Supreme Court in Cummings specifically reserved that question for a later time. If Cummings does apply, what other kinds of damages might there be. One argument might be lost opportunity. There may be other arguments as well. Damages under state law may be another way to get significant damages, such as we discussed here. How much interest plaintiff side lawyers will have in pursuing ADA/§504 claims as an alternative to §1983 claims will very much depend on how the courts wind up looking at damages.
  14. Survival of ADA claims is a federal question, and it depends upon whether the claim is remedial in nature or not. Compensatory damages are remedial in nature. See also this blog entry.
  15. It is also an open question on what the courts are split as to whether vicarious liability exists to a Title II entity when its employees violate the ADA. In the 11th Circuit, here, and arguably in the Fourth Circuit as well per this case, liability only happens if a an official with authority to address the discrimination knew of the likely federal rights violation but failed to act. There are cases saying that vicarious liability is possible as well. So, be sure to check your jurisdiction.