Today’s blog entry is on a case that we have blogged on before, Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, decided by the Seventh Circuit on August 5, 2025, here. Our previous blog entry on the case can be found here. The Seventh Circuit had to revisit the matter in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Groff v. DeJoy, which we discussed here. Robin Shea in her blog did an excellent job of discussing the latest opinion from the Seventh Circuit in Kluge, here. I just wanted to add a few thoughts of my own. The blog entry is super short even if it is divided into categories (no need to discuss the facts since we covered it previously), so the reader is going to want to read the whole thing.

 

A housekeeping matter: I do expect to blog next week. From 8/30-9/12, I will be out of town, so no blog entries during that time.

 

I

Majority Opinion (J. Brennan)

 

  1. When it comes to determining whether an undue burden exists, undue burden is governed by an objective standard. Subjective beliefs about whether an undue burden exists are not good enough.
  2. Failure to accommodate cases are not subject to the honest belief rule.

 

II

Dissenting Opinion (J. Rovner)

 

  1. Honest belief rule should apply.
  2. Gender dysphoria is a disability under the ADA.
  3. Mandating an objective test for failure to accommodate cases when it comes to accommodating religion goes too far.

 

III

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. This is a religious accommodation case and not a disability failure to accommodate case.
  2. It is very much an open question whether gender dysphoria is a disability under the ADA. I just saw yesterday that the DOJ has filed a statement of interest in a case where it argues that gender dysphoria is not protected by the ADA.
  3. It is big news that failure to accommodate cases are not subject to the honest belief rule. I see no reason why the reasoning of this decision with respect to failure to accommodate cases not being subject to the honest belief rule, would not carry over to disability failure to accommodate cases.
  4. It is also big news that an undue burden must be objectively based. Again, I see no reason why the reasoning of this decision would not carry over to disability failure to accommodate cases. I would expect plaintiff lawyers to liberally use this reasoning, especially when employers deny persons with disabilities remote work. A lot of the reasons I am seeing for why employers are cutting back on remote work, are arguably quite subjective rather than objective.
  5. The ADA actually uses the term undue hardship for Title I matters and undue burden for Titles II and III matters. While the terms are different, the meanings are identical. Since the meanings are the same, I don’t see any reason as mentioned above, why the reasoning of this case would not equally carry over to ADA failure to accommodate matters regardless of the Title involved.