Before getting started on the blog entry of the week, housekeeping matters. Next week I will be traveling most of the week, so do not expect a blog entry from me next workweek. Also, I just did an hour long interview with Claudine Wilkins, Esq., where we had a fantastic discussion about the federal and Georgia laws dealing with service animals and emotional support animals. I put it on my presentation page but am linking it here as well (I just found out, that the captioning could be much better. I have been informed that this will be fixed over the weekend (6/7-8), and then reposted).

Today’s blog entry is a short one and is a two-for-one. In the first case, the Eighth Circuit issued its en banc opinion in Huber v. Westar Foods, here. In the second case, we look at a United States District Court opinion from Oregon, Cusker v. Oregon Health Authority, here, talking about how ADA still applies even if the underlying issue involves something legal at the state level but not at the federal level. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: key holdings in en banc decision in Huber; Cusker facts; Cusker’s reasoning denying the motion to dismiss; and thoughts/takeaways on Huber and Cusker. The blog entry is super short, so the reader will probably want to read the whole thing.

 

I

Key Holdings in En Banc Decision in Huber

 

  1. We previously discussed the panel decision here. A couple of big things from that panel decision were their holding that the honest belief rule gets narrowed if the plaintiff’s conduct is related to their disability. Another key holding was that adverse action was not much of a requirement.
  2. The en banc decision pulls back on the panel decision in important ways. In particular, the honest belief rule is as it is and is not narrowed by disability related conduct. Even the dissent doesn’t make that point, at least not explicitly. Also, adverse action doesn’t really come up.
  3. Misconduct can be grounds for termination even if related to disability. That holding by itself is not unusual. See this blog entry for example. However, things can get complicated if disability related conduct is involved. See this blog entry and this blog entry for example.
  4. Both the majority and the concurrence/dissent allowed the FMLA interference claim to go forward. Both the majority and the dissent seem to be thinking about ADA interference in the same way as FMLA interference. However, depending upon your jurisdiction that is not the case. See this blog entry for example.
  5. The concurrence/dissent implicitly moves away from McDonnell Douglas burden shifting being the end-all and be-all with respect to summary judgment. In many ways, the dissent reads along the lines of what might be called a “convincing mosaic,” train of thought when it comes to reviewing the record.
  6. Published decision and broke down 6-5.

 

II

Cusker Facts

 

Oregon allows the use of magic mushrooms (psilocybin, which is a a hallucinogen). The use of magic mushrooms is limited to service centers where a client purchases, consumes, and experiences the effects of magic mushrooms under the supervision of a service facilitator. Plaintiffs are licensed or trained service facilitators for magic mushrooms seeking to provide home-based services to the disabled and terminally ill clients unable to travel to the service centers. Their view was that prohibiting home-based care violated Title II the ADA.

 

III

Cusker’s Reasoning Denying the Motion to Dismiss

 

  1. The requested remedy rests on physical access rather than use or distribution of a controlled substance in violation of state and federal laws.
  2. Plaintiffs seek compliance with the ADA so that their clients with disabilities will have the same physical access to a service that is available to nondisabled individuals.
  3. There is no conflict between federal (Controlled Substances Act), and state law in this case because plaintiffs are challenging and seeking modification of a state law to provide what plaintiffs contend are a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
  4. The case is about whether Oregon must make reasonable accommodation of home-based services necessary to allow individuals with disability to access services and not whether to authorize an expansion of Oregon’s limited legalization of magic mushrooms. Therefore, there is no conflict between the ADA and the Controlled Substances Act.

 

IV

 

Thoughts/takeaways on Huber and Cusker

 

  1. The Huber panel decision was an outlier in the discussion of how disability related conduct impacts the honest belief rule. The en banc decision pulls back from that. However, as referenced above, you do want to proceed carefully when disability related conduct is involved.
  2. The dissent between the lines, raises the issue of whether the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting system is appropriate for summary judgment at all. This is an issue that several Supreme Court justices have noted over the years as an area of concern for them. It has even come up recently at the Supreme Court in oral argument in some of the cases they have heard recently. There is a shift going on in the courts on this. For example, some courts, as we discussed here, adopt a convincing mosaic system. Other courts refuse to use that terminology but adopt a similar system. In courts in the Seventh Circuit, I have seen cases talking about the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework being one approach for dealing with summary judgment but another option being the case we discussed here (which is akin to convincing mosaic but the Seventh Circuit wants no part of that term). If a “convincing mosaic,” kind of approach winds up being the rule, that would leave room for disability related conduct to impact any honest belief considerations.
  3. Huber conflates FMLA interference with ADA interference. To my mind, they are very different things. See this blog entry for example.
  4. The Cusker opinion allows for the case to get beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Not addressed in the opinion is whether a fundamental alteration would be involved by allowing the home-based services. To my mind, that argument certainly exists. My go to case for fundamental alteration with respect to governmental programs is Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 1994). The Olmstead decision (527 U.S. 58 (1999)), also contains a discussion of fundamental alteration as a defense for governmental entities having to modify their programs.