Congratulations to the Indiana Hoosiers on an undefeated season culminating in the national championship. Also, congratulations to the remaining teams in the NFL playoffs. My Bears lost, but that play to send the game to overtime was incredible.

This week’s blog entry is a non-precedential decision from the Third Circuit decided on October 8 of 2025, which was on my birthday. Before getting to that, a brief update on Nawara v. County of Cook, which we discussed here. The update is that the Supreme Court refused to hear the case, so the case went back down to the trial court to determine damages where: 1) The trial court wound up determining that the plaintiff should get a backpay award of $30,773.93 minus the amount of his income during a temporary work as a security guard with UPS and Amazon, which was $4,715.57; 2) the court also reduced the award by the health insurance premium paid by Cook County while the plaintiff was on leave, an amount of $624.06; 3) the court also granted prejudgment interest based upon the average prime rate over the time period of the litigation, which came to $16,101.56; 4) the court required Cook County to make the plaintiff whole by calculating the value of the life pension contributions using reasonable actuarial assumptions in order to pay the plaintiff directly the full monetary equivalent of those contributions; 5) the court granted restoration of 88 days of vacation, holiday, comp time, and sick days without the award of any additional monetary relief: 6) the court stood by its order granting restoration of plaintiff’s seniority, which was 153 days; and 7) the court ordered that new petitions for prevailing party fees and costs be submitted.

Turning to the case of the week, Murphy v. State of Delaware, here, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning allowing the Title II and §504 claims to survive a motion to dismiss; court’s reasoning allowing the §1983 claim against the constables carrying out the eviction order to survive a motion to dismiss; a brief note on Judge Matey’s concurring and dissenting opinion; and thoughts/takeaways

I

Facts

Kenneth Stamford owned an apartment and previously leased it to Viola Wilson. After Wilson vacated the apartment, he leased it to Murphy. Even though he knew that Wilson had vacated the apartment and that the Murphys occupied the apartment under a valid lease, he filed an eviction notice against Wilson as if she still occupied the apartment. He did that without providing notice to the Murphys (the actual tenants), as required by Delaware law. He obtained a final judgment against Wilson in February 2021. He then had the JP court to issue a writ of possession to remove all persons from the property. A notice to Wilson was posted on the apartment door on February 5. However, Murphy was blind and could not read the notice. The constables executing the writ of possession observed that Murphy was blind and also that he was not obviously Viola Wilson, the person named in the eviction order. When Murphy provided the lease to the constables, one of them accused him of making it up. The constables called their supervisor for guidance who told them to remove all persons from the apartment and they could later challenge the eviction order in court. Murphy and his family was given 30 minutes to vacate the apartment and left on the street during a snowstorm. They were also forced to leave behind most of their possessions, including an urn containing the ashes of Murphy’s late wife and the laptop computers of his minor daughters that were being used for schooling as they were remote during the Covid-19 pandemic. The constables informed Murphy that his recourse was filing a complaint for wrongful eviction in the JP court, which he did. The JP court held an emergency hearing ruling in Murphy’s favor. The court was so appalled that it referred the matter for a criminal investigation. It also gave them the option of moving back into the apartment or terminating the lease. Due to Murphy’s deep distrust of Stanford, Murphy chose the latter option and subsequently filed lawsuits against Stanford (which settled), the JP court, and the constables executing the eviction claiming violations of title II, §504, and §1983.

II

Court’s Reasoning Allowing the Title II And §504 Claims To Survive A Motion To Dismiss

1. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability.
2. Title II’s final implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(7), requires a public entity to make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid such discrimination. The same prohibition per §504, applies to any federally funded program or activity
3. To state a claim under either Title II or §504 a plaintiff has to show: 1) he is a qualified individual; 2) with a disability; 3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, program, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; and 4) by reason of his disability.
4. Title II requires but for causation, while §504 requires that a plaintiff’s disability be the sole cause of the discrimination.
5. Plaintiff plausibly pleaded that his blindness led the defendant to evict him without notice readable by a blind person.
6. The constables gave him written notice of the eviction that he could not read because of his blindness. Nevertheless, they evicted him and his family anyway. Therefore, they denied the Murphys the benefit of a service, program, or activity that the constables provide 24 hours notice before an eviction.
7. Since Murphy’s disability was plausibly the only reason for being deprived of his notice, the causation standards under Title II as well as §504 were both satisfied.
8. Federal law requires the constables to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid discrimination based on disability unless they can demonstrate making the modification fundamentally alters the nature of the service, program or activity. At the pleading stage, the constables have not carried that burden.
9. Since the constables refused Murphy’s request to stop the eviction when he had not been given notice in a form understandable to a person with blindness, sufficient facts were alleged showing causation under both Title II and §504.
10. The constables are not entitled to an inference that someone read the complaint notice to Murphy, or that the person did so in a manner as effective as a notice provided in a format understandable to a person with blindness.
11. 28 C.F.R. §35.160(c)(2) states that a public entity cannot rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication.
12. The constables are not entitled to an inference that Murphy would have not taken any action to avoid the eviction if he had been given notice in a form understandable to a person with blindness.

III

Court’s Reasoning Allowing The §1983 Claim Against the Constables Carrying The Eviction Order To Survive A Motion To Dismiss

1. The official capacity claims are dismissed because Murphy did not plausibly allege an ongoing violation of federal law supporting the request for a prospective relief.
2. The §1983 claims against the constables can move forward because the quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to the manner in which the court order was executed, though it does extend to the court order itself.
3. At this stage of the litigation, the court is unable to conclude that the constables lacked the discretion to postpone evicting Murphy and his family under the circumstances alleged prior to any discovery having taken place.

IV

A Brief Note on Judge Matey’s Concurring And Dissenting Opinion

1. Judge Matey agreed with the court dismissing the official capacity claims. However, he believed the responsibility lies with the landlord and the claims against everyone else should be dismissed as a result of quasi-judicial immunity concerns.

V

Thoughts/Takeaways

1. I get calls at least once a month, and it is not unusual for me to get them twice a month from around the country, where a person with a disability informs me that a court is denying them access to the court proceedings because of their disability. I would say 90% of the time it is family courts that are the problem but not always.
2. Title II and §504 apply to everything that a public entity does.
3. Causation is different under §504 (sole cause), v. Title II of the ADA (by reason of, i.e. but for). The difference between the two is significant, though it wasn’t an issue in this case.
4. In a footnote, the court mentions that the Third Circuit has not squarely addressed the question of whether claims may be brought against government officers in their individual capacities under Title II. I can say that with the exception of the 11^th Circuit when it comes to retaliation by an employee of a public entity, the courts are uniformly rejecting individual liability under Title II of the ADA.
5. In that same footnote, the court says that a public entity may be vicariously liable for its employees conduct under Title II of the ADA and that the defendant did not dispute that. As we have discussed previously, such as here, it is not a slam dunk that a public entity is automatically vicariously liable for its employees conduct under Title II of the ADA. So, be sure to check your jurisdiction when faced with this question.
6. Title II of the ADA and §504 require pro-active measures to avoid discrimination, which includes making reasonable modifications to policy, practices, or procedures absent a fundamental alteration to the service, program, or activity.
7. Remember the do’s and don’ts of the interactive process, which can be found here.
8. The ADA is a nondelegable duty and a public entity does not get the ability to rely on someone else doing their obligations for them, i.e. having someone else read and inaccessible eviction notice to a person with a disability.
9. While the judge issuing the court order gets immunity, that doesn’t extend necessarily to individuals carrying out that order.
10. The §1983 piece of this case is interesting because I have seen cases saying that §1983 is not possible when in reality you are looking at a violation of Title II of the ADA. So, be sure to check your jurisdiction when that situation comes up.
11. Training, training, training by individuals knowledgeable in the ADA is so important. Such training would have likely prevented this scenario.