I am very regular about posting blog entries for the week. I have rarely missed doing that over the 14 years I have been doing this. I do have a good explanation for missing last week. My father died a week ago today, and I was away for funeral events. By any objective measure he lived a very full and long life.  He definitely would not have wanted me to not leave blogging alone for a considerable length of time, because I enjoy doing it so much. So, we are back on track this week.

 

The blog entry for the week is the case of Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc., here, a published decision decided by the Ninth Circuit on October 24, 2025. One of the reasons I picked this case to blog on, is that I have seen media reports on it. After reading the case, I am not sure the media reports I have seen got it right. So, I wanted to take a crack at it, especially since the legal principles involved are procedurally important. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: facts; court’s reasoning that the removal of architectural barriers by the defendant was readily achievable; court’s reasoning that Gilbert’s full and equal access to the facility was denied; court’s reasoning that Gilbert has standing to pursue an Unruh Act violation; court’s reasoning that Gilbert’s motivation for visiting the store was irrelevant; court’s reasoning rejecting 7-Eleven’s argument that plaintiff must have a bona fide intent to be a customer in order to have standing under the Unruh Act; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.

 

I

Facts (Taken Directly from the Opinion)

 

In August 2021, Gilbert drove his wheelchair-accessible van to a 7-Eleven convenience store in Rio Linda, California. 2 During this visit, the van-accessible parking space was occupied, so Gilbert parked in an adjacent regular parking space. Using his prosthetic leg, Gilbert walked behind the vehicle parked in the van-accessible space and up the sidewalk curb ramp from the stall access aisle to the sidewalk in front of the store. Because of his balance issues, Gilbert had some trouble walking up the sidewalk curb ramp, which had an “excessive and uneven slope.” He was also “tired because of the ‘energy’ he had to expend to get into 1 After Gilbert’s death in July 2024, his successors in interest were substituted as the relevant parties on appeal. We remand to the district court to address any issues raised by the substitution. 2 We summarize the district court’s factual findings, which are undisputed on appeal. 6 Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc. the store.” Once inside, Gilbert purchased items from the store.

 

Gilbert sued 7-Eleven under the ADA and Unruh Act two months later. 3 In relevant part, he asserted that 7-Eleven discriminated against him in violation of the ADA by failing to remove architectural barriers where such removal was readily achievable, and by denying him “full and equal enjoyment” of its store based on his disability. Gilbert sought injunctive relief under the ADA to remove these barriers. He also alleged that this ADA violation violated the Unruh Act, under which he sought statutory damages. After Gilbert filed this lawsuit, 7-Eleven remodeled the parking lot and entryway. As a result, the store now has an ADA-compliant van-accessible parking stall, access aisle, curb ramp, and entry walkway.

 

The district court held a two-day bench trial and concluded that “[d]uring his visits to the [s]tore, Gilbert personally encountered a lack of accessible route of travel from the designated accessible parking to the [s]tore entrance” because of several different violations of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines. The district court further concluded that although 7-Eleven’s voluntary removal of the challenged barriers mooted Gilbert’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA, Gilbert “established that 7-Eleven violated the ADA with regard to the route of travel from the designated accessible parking to the [s]tore.” Because a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act, see Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), the district court awarded 3 Gilbert also asserted a violation of California’s Health and Safety Code, but the district court ruled for 7-Eleven on that claim. Because Gilbert does not appeal that ruling, we do not discuss it. Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc. 7 Gilbert $4,000 in statutory damages, see Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52(a), 55.56. 7-Eleven appealed.

 

II

Court’s Reasoning That the Removals of Architectural Barriers by the Defendant Was Readily Achievable

 

  1. In the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of articulating a plausible proposal for barrier removal, the costs of which on its face do not clearly exceed its benefits. However, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, that is proving barrier removal is not readily achievable.
  2. 7-Eleven concedes that it voluntarily altered its premises to comply with the ADA after Gilbert filed his action. 7-Eleven also did not present any competing evidence to meet its burden of persuasion.
  3. 7-Eleven’s voluntary remodel demonstrates that the barrier removal was readily achievable. So, Gilbert did not have to do anything else, and it doesn’t matter that he did not provide evidence to satisfy his initial burden.

 

III

Court’s Reasoning Back Gilbert’s Full and Equal Access to the Facility Was Denied

 

  1. Since the ADA accessibility guidelines outline the technical standards required for full and equal enjoyment, if a barrier violates those standards related to a plaintiff’s disability, that barrier automatically impairs the plaintiff’s full and equal access, which constitutes discrimination under the ADA.
  2. Since the record plainly shows that Gilbert personally encountered barriers relating to her disability as a mobility impaired individual using a prosthetic leg and wheelchair to get around, the district court properly held that Gilbert established an ADA violation.

 

IV

Court’s Reasoning That Gilbert Has Standing to Pursue an Unruh Act Violation

 

  1. Standing under the Unruh Act is broad.
  2. An individual personally encountering an ADA violation while transacting with a brick-and-mortar business has standing to bring an Unruh Act claim.
  3. Gilbert personally encountered a construction -related ADA violation while purchasing items from 7-Eleven’s store. As such, that was all Gilbert needed to establish standing under the Unruh Act.

 

V

Court’s Reasoning That Gilbert’s Motivation for Visiting the Store Is Irrelevant

 

  1. Nothing in the Unruh Act or in any case interpreting it, bars a claim by a plaintiff who can show injury (the encountered alleged discrimination when they transacted with the defendant’s business), just because they were motivated by a desire to initiate litigation.
  2. Whether motivation matters, is a question for the legislature, and the California legislature has taken no steps with respect to that issue.
  3. Gilbert’s motivation in initiating litigation has no bearing on her standing under the Unruh Act.

VI

Court’s Reasoning Rejecting 7-Eleven’s Argument That Plaintiff Must Have A Bona Fide Intent To Be A Customer In Order To Have Standing

 

  1. Motivation and intent are not synonymous.
  2. In a footnote, the court noted that when California amended the Unruh Act to deal with serial plaintiffs, it did not revise the damages available, but rather it set forth additional procedural hurdles.
  3. Whether Gilbert desired to initiate litigation does not undermine the fact she actually purchased items from the store.
  4. California Supreme Court has said that a plaintiff has standing where that plaintiff had transacted with a defendant and has been subjected to discrimination under the Unruh Act.
  5. The California Supreme Court has made clear that it does not require a plaintiff to show they have a bona fide intent to use the defendant’s services where the plaintiff actually transacted with the defendant’s business.
  6. Any intent element that has been discussed by the California Supreme Court acts as a substitute for either completing a transaction or presenting oneself for services at a brick and mortar store and not as an additional requirement.
  7. Gilbert showed that she personally encountered a construction-related violation at a place of public accommodation and experienced difficulty due to that violation.
  8. Requiring a plaintiff to also (emphasis in opinion), show that they visited the business with intent to use its services in order to establish standing is inconsistent with the plain text of the Unruh Act.
  9. Under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff is denied full and equal access if the plaintiff personally encountered the violation on a particular occasion, or (emphasis in opinion), the plaintiff was deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion.
  10. If a plaintiff personally encounters a violation, the Unruh Act requires the plaintiff to show that they experienced difficulty, discomfort, or embarrassment because of the violation, but it does not require any showing of intent. In other words, where a plaintiff personally encounters construction -related accessibility violations, they need to show they were affected by the violation, but they do need to show they intended to use the defendant’s services on a particular occasion.
  11. Court cannot add an intent requirement without going against the broad determine and remedial purposes of the Unruh Act and California’s separation of power principles, which mandate that courts refrain from creating extra-statutory barriers to statutory remedies.
  12. It is unnecessary to add a bona fide intent requirement for purposes of standing requirements in a case like this because it is obvious that Gilbert had a concrete and actual interest that was not merely hypothetical or conjectural.
  13. The Ninth Circuit has never held that intent was required for standing under California law.

 

 

VII

Thoughts/Takeaways

 

  1. When it comes to architectural barriers, the Americans with Disabilities Act Architectural Guidelines act as a strict liability statute. Outside of architectural barriers, Title III does not work that way.
  2. I have no idea how you could assess whether the costs of barrier removal on their face does not clearly exceed its benefits.
  3. Barrier removal looks to the entire resources of the particular entity.
  4. 7-Eleven remediated the problem in a hurry in order to eliminate the plaintiff’s ability to seek injunctive relief. However, California has the Unruh Act, so the plaintiff was still entitled to statutory damages and to attorney fees.
  5. Intent to use a store, actually using that store, and the motivation for going into that store to make a purchase, are entirely different concepts. The distinction matters for purposes of standing.
  6. Title III regulations. 28 C.F.R. §36.304(b), (c), talks about readily achievable barriers and the priority for addressing removal of those barriers.
  7. 7-Eleven is lucky that the plaintiff did not suffer personal injuries because it would be quite possible, depending upon the State, including Georgia and most probably California as well, that the plaintiff could use the lack of ADA compliance for the ramp as a basis for a negligence per se claim, as we discussed here.